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GENERAL^ ELECTRIC
ABSTRACT
This volume of Manned Space Flight Nuclear System Safety contains the Design and Operations
Guidelines and Requirements developed in the study of Space Shuttle Nuclear System trans-
portation. Guidelines and Requirements are presented for the Shuttle, nuclear payloads
(reactor, isotope-Brayton and small isotope sources), ground support systems and facilities.
Cross indices and references are provided which relate guidelines to each other, and to sub-
stantiating data in other volumes. The guidelines are intended for the implementation of
nuclear safety related design and operational considerations in future space programs.
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FOREWORD
The establishment and operation of large manned space facilities in earth orbit would consti-
tute a significant step forward in space. Such long duration programs with orbital stay times
of up to ten years would benefit the earth's populace and the scientific community by provid-
ing:
1. A flexible tool for scientific research.
2. A permanent base for earth oriented applications.
3. A foundation for the future exploration of our universe.
Specifically, the NASA objectives include earth surveys and scientific disciplines of astron-
omy, bioscience, chemistry, physics and biomedicine, as well as the development of tech-
nology for space and earth applications.
Operational and design requirements, of large manned space vehicles, differ from those of
the Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo programs. Of particular interest are the radiation sur-
«,.
vivability and nuclear safety requirements imposed by nuclear power reactors and isotopes
and the long term interaction with the natural radiation environment.
The General Electric Company under contract to NASA-MSFC (NAS8-26283) has performed
a study entitled "Space Base Nuclear System Safety" for the express purposes of addressing
the nuclear considerations involved in manned earth orbital missions. The study addresses
both operational and general earth populace and ecological nuclear safety aspects. The pri-
mary objective is to identify and evaluate the potential and inherent radiological hazards as-
sociated with such missions and recommend approaches for hazard elimination or reduction
of risk.
Work performed utilized the Phase A Space Base designs developed for NASA by North
American Rockwell and McDonnell Douglas as baseline documentation.
The study was sponsored jointly by NASA's Office of Manned Space Flight, Office of Ad-
vanced Research and Technology, and Aerospace Safety Research and Data Institute. It was
performed for NASA's George C. Marshall Space Flight Center under the direction of Mr.
Walter H. Stafford of the Advanced Systems Analysis Office. He was assisted by a joint NASA
and AEC advisory group, chaired by Mr. Herbert Schaefer of NASA's Office of Manned Space
Flight.
The results of the study are presented in seven volumes, the titles of which are listed in
Table A. A cross-reference matrix of the subjects covered in the various volumes is pre-
sented in Table B.
Table A. Manned Space Flight Nuclear System Safety Documentation
Volume
I
Part 1
. Part 2
II
Part 1
Part 1A
III
Part 1
Part 2
Part 2 A
Part 3
IV
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This study employs the International system of units and where appropriate the equivalent
English units are specified in brackets. A list of Conversion Factors and a Glossary of
Terms is included in the back of each volume.
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SECTION 1
INTRODUCTION
The guidelines and requirements developed during the study of the transport of nuclear payloads
to and from earth orbit by the Space Shuttle are presented in this Volume. Each guideline
describes a design or operational feature which, if implemented, would alleviate or minimize
a particular hazard(s) and thereby increase the safety and success of the mission.
A major distinction has been made between a guideline and a requirement. A requirement
is only noted as such if it has been classified as a mandatory provision under all circumstances.
When any doubt exists, when alternative measures can be taken or when the provision increases
the safety of the mission, but may not be required to accomplish the mission objectives, a
guideline notation has been given. A majority of the considerations presented fall into the
guideline category.
Guidelines prepared for the major Space Base and Terrestrial Safety Study are presented
under separate cover - Volume V, Part 1.
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SECTION 2
GUIDELINES AND REQUIREMENTS DESCRIPTION
Figure 2-1 shows the format used in reporting all guidelines. The content and use of the
format is discussed below.
SPACE SHUTTLE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
FROaRAM EUEMENT I SVSTEM-SUBSVBTEM
MISSION FMASE^VENT
DATE
JAN 72
OPERATION
TITLE I
STATEMENT:
JUSTIFICATION :
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REFERENCES: CROSS REFERENCES:
Figure 2-1. Guideline Format
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2.1 NUMBER
The identifying alphanumerical designation consists of two letters followed by a three digit
number.
Guideline (R - Requirement)
Design Feature (O - Operations Feature)
• Numerical Designator
GD-125
The first alpha character denotes whether the statement is a guideline (G) or a mandatory
requirement (R). The second alpha character distinguishes between design considerations
(D) or operational procedures (O). Series 101 to 200 have been reserved for numerical
designation of the guidelines and requirements for the Space Shuttle Nuclear System Trans-
portation Study.
2.2 PROGRAM ELEMENT
The program element denotes the major vehicle/program for which the guideline is intended,
i.e., Space Base, Space Shuttle, Space Tug, Launch Vehicle, Launch Center, etc.
2.3 SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM GROUPING
Associated with each program element are various top level groupings of equipment designated
as Systems or Subsystems. The system/subsystem groupings designated for this study
include the following:
Shuttle Systems
Reactor Payload
Isotope Reentry Vehicle (IRV) - Payload
Small Isotope Sources - Payload
Ground Support
Facilities
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2.4 OPERATION
The operation column is used to denote the particular operation or function to which the
guideline is directed. Typical operation categories are isotope cooling, Shuttle transport,
ground handling, payload monitoring, recovery, etc.
2.5 MISSION PHASE/EVENT
The phase or phases of the mission for which the guideline applies is listed. The various
phases of the Shuttle transport mission are shown in Figure 2-2.
END OF MISS ION
DISPOSAL/
RECOVERY
ON-ORBIT
OPERATIONS
SHUTTLE
LAUNCH/ASCENT
PRELAUNCH
Figure 2-2. Mission Phases
2.6 TITLE
The title is provided to briefly identify the subject matter of the guideline. It is used in the
cross index along with the alphanumeric designation to provide the necessary descriptive
words to concisely identify the guideline and content.
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2.7 STATEMENT
The statement contains the guideline, and is usually a brief statement, preferably one
sentence, which describes a suggested means by which a hazard may be alleviated or elimin-
ated. All statements for a particular Program/System form a useful checklist for a program
manager or designer. Typical examples include:
• Consider use of an inert gas positive pressure liner for encasement of all or
portions of a reactor.
• Provide a rapid response back-up isotope cooling system at the launch pad which
does not require the opening of Shuttle doors.
• Consider dumping of excess Shuttle propellant prior to landing to minimize explosive
potential.
2.8 JUSTIFICATION
The justification contains a brief substantiation for the guideline in terms of the nature of the
hazards presented. A hazard category column is provided to be used in conformance with the
hazard categories listed in NASA office of Manned Space Flight Safety Program Directive No. 1
Revision A. Due to the preliminary nature of this study hazard categories were not assigned
to individual guidelines. However, this potential exists and should be reserved for subsequent
evaluations.
2.9 REMARKS
The remarks column is intended to provide additional information needed to further define the
guideline or to indicate techniques worthy of consideration which could be applied or are used
in existing systems.
2.10 REFERENCES
The key references (supporting data) in the study final reports or other related documents
which are used to arrive at the guidelines are listed.
2.11 CROSS REFERENCES
The cross reference column lists the related guidelines that should be referred to by the
user.
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SECTION 3
GUIDELINE USAGE
This particular set of guidelines is intended for use by:
1. Space Shuttle Program/Design personnel in implementing nuclear payload and
nuclear safety operational and design considerations in the Shuttle program.
2. Nuclear Payload development personnel in implementing safety related design
and operational features for the reactor, isotope-Brayton and Small isotope systems.
3. System safety personnel in planning, establishing priorities, directing and controlling
the safety program.
The guidelines can be used to establish requirements on future hardware design and develop-
ment. They can also be used as a checklist against a preliminary or final design. They
also form the basis of trade-off evaluations for the optimization of design when considering
safety as related to performance, cost, schedules, etc.
Safety guidelines impact design details, operations and procedures and in some instances
can be classified as key configuration drivers. It is important that safety guidelines be re-
viewed at an early date for implementation on the Shuttle program. Early consideration and
implementation will result in a design capable of supporting nuclear hardware missions with
minimum perturbations on Shuttle systems and Ground Support.
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SECTION 4
GUIDELINES AND REQUIREMENTS CROSS INDEX
This section contains cross indices of all the guidelines and requirements developed.
4.1 HAZARD REDUCTION SEQUENCE INDEX
Table 4-1 contains a summary of the key guidelines in accordance with the hazard reduction
sequence of the OMSF Safety Program Directive No. 1, Revision 4. This hazard reduction
precedence sequence is as follows:
4.1.1 DESIGN FOR MINIMUM HAZARD
The major effort throughout the design phases shall be to insure inherent safety through the
selection of appropriate design features (e. g., fail safe design, redundancy, increased
ultimate safety factor).
4.1.2 SAFETY DEVICES
Known hazards which cannot be eliminated through design selection shall be reduced to the
acceptable level through the use of appropriate safety devices as part of the system, sub-
system, or equipment.
4.1.3 WARNING DEVICES
Where it is not possible to preclude the existence or occurrence of a known hazard, devices
shall be employed for the timely detection of the condition and the generation of an adequate
warning signal. Warning signals and their application shall be designed to minimize the
probability of wrong signals or of improper personnel reaction to the signals.
4.1.4 SPECIAL PROCEDURES
Where it is not possible to reduce the magnitude of an existing or potential hazard through
design, or the use of safety and warning devices, special procedures shall be developed to
counter hazardous conditions for enhancement of ground and flight crew safety. Precautionary
notations shall be standardized in accordance with the direction of the procuring activity.
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4.2 CROSS INDEX - GUIDELINE STATEMENTS
A cross index and useful checklist of all the guideline/requirement statements associated
with the Reactor, Isotope Reentry Vehicle, Small Isotope Sources, Shuttle, Ground Support
and Facilities is contained in the following pages.
4.3 CROSS INDEX - TITLE
The cross index, by title and applicable system, of all the guidelines and requirements
developed is contained in Table 4-2.
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REACTOR-GUIDELINE STATEMENTS
RD-105 Provide fireball protection adequate to assure containment of all radioactive
material in event of an accident (critical for isotopes; may be necessary for
reactors.
RO-103 Minimize overflight of land and continental shelf areas.
RO-104 Provide suitable personnel exclusion area at the launch and landing sites,
(4 km fallback area and approximately 13 km administrative control zone).
RO-105 Provide procedures for permanent reactor shutdown prior to separation from
Space Base.
RO-107 Establish emergency procedures and decisions (contingency plans) for emergency
situations involving nuclear hardware.
GD-101 Provide an inert gas blanket and/or double containment during the prelaunch
period to preclude a NaK-oxygen reaction in the event of NaK leak.
GD-102 Consider use of an inert gas positive pressure liner for encasement of all or
portions of a reactor power module - considered particularly important for the
in-orbit retrieval and landing site removal of a damaged power module.
GD-103 Provide double containment of liquid metal components where feasible.
GD-104 Provide blast overpressure and fragmentation protection adequate to assure con-
tainment of all radioactive material in event of an accident (critical requirement
for isotopes; may be desirable for reactors).
GD-105 Provide multiple and independent system monitoring and control equipment with
instantaneous and recording outputs for all mission phases.
GD-106 Provide NaK loop design which does not require breaking or opening of NaK
loops for replacement and maintenance.
GD-107 Provide up to 1 kilowatt of electrical power (either from the Transfer Module
or the Shuttle).
GD-108 Assure maximum allowable shuttle crew-nuclear payload separation distance
(e. g., provide for the placement of the reactor/shield as far aft in the cargo
bay as permitted within shuttle c. g. and power module configuration restrictions).
GD-109 Consider provision of a reactor/shield assembly separable from the radiator at
end of mission.
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GD-110 Provide for decay heat removal and radiation shielding if a spent reactor is
transferred to the Shuttle less than 10 days after shutdown.
GD-111 Provide capability of detecting and alerting the Shuttle crew of a liquid metal
leak which would render the power module inoperable and provide potential
hazards within the Shuttle cargo bay.
GD-112 Consider provision of liquid metal fire suppression material within the Shuttle.
GD-113 Consider a Shuttle return of only a reactor/shield by a design which permits
in-orbit separation of the radiator and other components.
GD-119 Provide certified equipment to handle nuclear payloads.
GD-120 Provide dry N purging capability of the Shuttle cargo bay while on the launch
pad.
GD-121 Consider use of Transfer Module integration scheme to reduce and simplify
Shuttle interfaces and to improve safety in handling nuclear payloads.
GD-122 Prevent propellant boil-off and other undesirable gases from entering Shuttle
cargo bay with the doors closed by provision of an environmental enclosure.
GD-123 Provide multiple and independent radiation monitoring equipment with instan-
taneous and recording outputs.
GD-124 Provide capability of detecting and alerting the Shuttle crew of nuclear payload
failures which occur during transport.
GD-125 Provide a free, unobstructed, and directed ejection path for the payload in the
event of a Shuttle booster or orbiter explosion on the launch pad.
GD-126 Provide intact reentry and impact capability. Consider use of crush-up
materials in Shuttle orbiter cargo bay to minimize damage upon Shuttle land
impact.
GD-127 Provide tracking and recovery devices on nuclear payloads.
GD-128 Provide a clean, smooth surface cargo bay to facilitate decontamination and
minimize the time required.
GO-101 Provide certified operation plans to store reactor power systems and check out
reactor power systems and components.
GO-102 Provide fire alarm and protection system training and procedures capable of
supporting hardware containing nuclear material and liquid metals in nuclear
facility, transporter and at the launch pad.
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GO-103 Provide operational procedures for maintaining an inert gas blanket and/or
double containment during the prelaunch period to preclude a NaK-oxygen
reaction in the event of NaK leak.
GO-104 Provide a controlled environment liquid metal safing capability at launch and
landing sites (reduction of O sources).
z
GO-105 Provide certified unloading, decontamination and liquid metal equipment and
procedures to handle nuclear reator power modules subsequent to Shuttle
landing.
GO-106 Provide installation, retrieval, and maintenance procedures that do not require
breaking or opening of NaK loops.
GO-107 Provide Shuttle crew training with confirmed procedures in the use of multiple
and independent system monitoring equipment with instantaneous and recorded
outputs for all mission phases.
GO-108 Provide rendezvous and docking positions such that the Shuttle crew locations
are within the shadow of the reactor shield to minimize the dose to the crew
during docking and replacement operations.
GO-109 Consider allowing at least 10 days after shutdown before enacting Shuttle trans-
fer operations with a spent reactor. If this procedure is not possible, provide
for decay heat removal and radiation shielding if the spent reactor is to be
transferred to the Shuttle less than 10 days after shutdown.
GO-110 Provide certified operational plans to dispose of or recover a spent reactor
power module.
GO-111 Provide a minimum 100 year orbital lifetime for a spent reactor in high earth
orbit (250 year orbit is preferred to give 9 half-life decay.
GO-112 Consider capability to install a replaceable or strap-on reactor disposal system
by the Shuttle crew.
GO-113 Consider capability of reactor/shield separation from the radiator at end of
mission (disposal or recovery).
GO-114 Consider means of long term tracking of reactor power module following boost
to a high earth disposal orbit (for possible recovery at a later date).
GO-115 Consider reactor reboost capability to a new long-life orbit by the Shuttle.
GO-125 Provide support personnel and Shuttle crew training with confirmed procedures
in the use of multiple and independent radiation monitoring equipment with
instantaneous and recorded outputs.
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GO-126 Provide recovery gear and procedures for use subsequent to prelaunch acci-
dents.
GO-127 Provide operations in the use of Transfer Modules to protect and reduce handling
and packaging requirements of nuclear payloads.
GO-128 Provide Shuttle radiation and liquid metal decontamination capability at the
launch and landing sites.
GO-12 9 Provide emergency capability and procedures for ejection of the pay load over
deep ocean areas (or continental shelf) or possible ditching of the Shuttle.
GO-130 Provide tracking and location capability for early land and water recovery.
GO-131 Provide for emergency retrieval/recovery of nuclear equipment if jettisoned
from the Space Shuttle.
GO-132 Provide trained impact/recovery team and procedures for recovery, fire pro-
tection, radiation control and decontamination.
GO-133 Provide launch during unsatisfactory weather conditions, including moderate
to high winds blowing towards populated areas.
GO-134 Minimize the crew dose rate throughout all operations (maximum of 150
mrem/day).
GO-13 5 Minimize radiation dose to crews performing contingency operations (maximum
of 150 mrem/day from nuclear sources should be maintained).
GO-136 Consider use of a back-up Shuttle to support repair of a failed Shuttle or transfer
or retrieval of the payload in orbit for the continuance of the mission.
GO-137 Provide contingencies for Shuttle orbital stay times of up to 20 days to allow
for repairs to be made.
GO-138 Where in-orbit repairs of interfacing non-nuclear hardware (transfer mecha-
nisms, etc.) are unsuccessful, the Shuttle and payload should return to earth.
GO-139 Consider payload ejection through cargo bay doors if doors cannot be opened.
GO-140 Provide certified operational plans to launch and perform orbital transfer
operations involving nuclear hardware.
GO-141 Provide positive control of nuclear payloads during all handling operations.
GO-142 Provide nuclear cargo transfer operations that do not involve EVA.
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GO-143 Provide direct visual or TV coverage of all nuclear cargo transfer operations.
GO-144 Provide alternate and/or redundant equipment and procedures for nuclear cargo
handling.
GO-145 Consider feasibility of uncooperative "tumbling" power module retrieval with
Shuttle.
GO-146 Provide Shuttle landing area remote from inhabited facilities.
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ISOTOPE RE-ENTRY VEHICLE (IRV) - GUIDELINE STATEMENTS
RD-101 Provide isotope heat source cooling to 420°K (300° F), or less.
RD-102 Provide passive cooling systems, or redundant active systems, throughout all
phases of the Shuttle-isotope heat source mission.
RD-103 Provide a redundant active isotope cooling system within the Shuttle cargo bay
to be operable on ascent and return/re-entry with at least 24 hours emergency
operating time.
RD-104 Provide blast overpressure and fragmentation protection adequate to assure
containment of all radioactive material in event of an accident (critical require-
ment for isotopes; may be desirable for reactors).
RD-105 Provide fireball protection adequate to assure containment of all radioactive
material in event of an accident (critical for isotopes; may be necessary
for reactors).
RO-101 Provide and confirm procedures for the cooling of isotope payloads for all
phases of the Shuttle mission (no identifiable failure modes or provide re-
dundant cooling systems).
RO-102 Provide procedures to assure isotope heat source cooling to 420° K (300° F)
or less during prelaunch.
RO-103 Minimize overflight of land and continental shelf areas.
RO-104 Provide suitable personnel exclusion area at the launch and landing sites, (4 km
fallback area and approximately 13 km administrative control zone).
RO-106 Provide for Shuttle retrieval and recovery of a heat source with a damaged
shield or fuel capsule fractures.
RO-107 Establish emergency procedures and decisions (contingency plans) for
emergency situations involving nuclear hardware.
GD-114 Provide a rapid response back-up isotope cooling system at the launch pad
which does not require opening of the Shuttle doors.
GD-115 Provide approximately 300 watts of electrical power (either from the Transfer
Module or the Shuttle).
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GD-116 Provide multiple and independent system monitoring and control equipment
with instantaneous and recording inputs for all mission phases.
GD-117 Assure maximum allowable shuttle crew - nuclear payload separation distance.
(IRV should be placed with side-on view to crew locations).
GD-118 Consider provision of flotation gear for an isotope-Brayton heat source
(possibly time limited).
GD-119 Provide certified equipment to handle nuclear payloads.
GD-120 Provide dry N purging capability of the Shuttle cargo bay while on the launch
pad.
GD-121 Consider use of Transfer Module integration scheme to reduce and simplify
Shuttle interfaces and to improve safety in handling nuclear payloads.
GD-122 Prevent propellant boil-off and other undesirable gases from entering Shuttle
cargo bay with the doors closed by provision of an environmental enclosure.
GD-123 Provide multiple and independent radiation monitoring equipment with instan-
taneous and recording outputs.
GD-124 Provide capability of detecting and alerting the Shuttle crew of nuclear payload
failures which occur during transport.
GD-125 Provide a free, unobstructed, and directed ejection path for the payload in the
event of a Shuttle booster or or biter explosion on the launch pad.
GD-126 Provide intact re-entry and impact capability. Consider use of crush-up
materials in Shuttle orbiter cargo bay to minimize damage upon Shuttle land
impact.
GD-127 Provide tracking and recovery devices on nuclear payloads.
GD-128 Provide a clean, smooth surface cargo bay to facilitate decontamination, and
minimize the time required.
GO-116 Provide certified operational plans to: Receive and store isotope fuel capsules,
Load isotope fuel capsules into heat source, Install heat source in IRV and Check
out isotope power systems and components.
GO-117 Provide fire alarm and protection system training and procedures capable of
supporting isotope hardware at: Nuclear facility, Transporter and Launch pad.
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GO-118 Provide'quick retrieval operations to remove nuclear payload during an
emergency.
GO-119 Install the isotope heat source in the Shuttle cargo bay at the last practicable
point in the launch countdown sequence.
GO-120 Provide capability to reduce ignitable propellant fumes around the cargo bay
(i. e., drainage of propellant tanks and/or purging immediate payload area).
GO-121 Avoid or limit operations of the crew which place them in the near vicinity of
the heat source and in particular those positions perpendicular to the radiating
surface.
GO-122 Provide Shuttle crew training with confirmed procedures in the use of multiple
and independent system monitoring equipment with instantaneous and recorded
outputs for all mission phases.
GO-123 Provide certified removal equipment and procedures to handle the nuclear
payload subsequent to Shuttle landing.
GO-124 Provide certified operational plans to retrieve and recover IB.V and/or small
isotope sources.
GO-125 Provide support personnel and Shuttle crew training with confirmed procedures
in the use of multiple and independent radiation monitoring equipment with in-
stantaneous and recorded outputs.
• GO-126 Provide recovery gear and procedures for use subsequent to prelaunch acci-
dents.
GO-127 Provide operations in the use of Transfer Modules to protect and reduce handling
and packaging requirements of nuclear payloads.
GO-128 Provide Shuttle radiation and liquid metal decontamination capability at the
launch and landing sites.
GO-129 Provide emergency capability and procedures for ejection of the payload over
deep ocean areas (or continental shelf) or possible ditching of the Shuttle.
GO-130 Provide tracking and location capability for early land and water recovery.
GO-131 Provide for emergency retrieval/recovery of nuclear equipment if jettisoned
from the Space Shuttle.
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GO-132 Provide trained impact/recovery team and procedures for: Recovery, Fire
protection, Radiation control and Decontamination.
GO-133 Prohibit launch during unsatisfactory weather conditions, including moderate
to high winds blowing towards populated areas.
GO-134 Minimize the crew dose rate throughout all operations (maximum of 150 mrem/
day).
GO-135 Minimize radiation dose to crews performing contingency operations (maximum
of 150 mrem/day from nuclear sources should be maintained).
GO-136 Consider use of a back-up Shuttle to support repair of a failed Shuttle for
transfer or retrieval of the payload in orbit for the continuance of the mission.
GO-137 Provide contingencies for Shuttle orbital stay times of up to 20 days to allow
for repairs to be made.
GO-138 Where in-orbit repairs of interfacing non-nuclear hardware (transfer mech-
anisms, etc.) are unsuccessful, the Shuttle and payload should return to earth.
GO-139 Consider payload ejection through cargo bay doors if doors cannot be opened.
GO-140 Provide certified operational plans to launch and perform orbital transfer
operations involving nuclear hardware.
GO-141 Provide positive control of nuclear payloads during all handling operations.
GO-142 Provide nuclear cargo transfer operations that do not involve EVA.
GO-143 Provide direct visual or TV coverage of all nuclear cargo transfer operations.
GO-144 Provide alternate and/or redundant equipment and procedures for nuclear cargo
handling.
GO-145 Consider feasibility of uncooperative "tumbling" power module retrieval with
Shuttle.
GO-146 Provide Shuttle landing area remote from inhabited facilities.
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SMALL ISOTOPE SOURCES-GUIDELINE STATEMENTS
RD-101 Provide isotope heat source cooling to 420° K (300 °F), or less.
RD-102 Provide passive cooling systems, or redundant active systems, throughout
all phases of the Shuttle-isotope heat source mission.
RD-103 Provide a redundant active isotope cooling system within the Shuttle cargo bay
to be operable on ascent and return/reentry with at least 24 hours emergency
operating time.
RD-104 Provide blast overpressure and fragmentation protection adequate to assure
containment of all radioactive material in event of an accident (critical re-
quirement for isotopes; may be desirable for reactors).
RD-105 Provide fireball protection adequate to assure containment of all radioactive
material in event of an accident (cricial for isotopes; may be necessary for
reactors).
RO-101 Provide and confirm procedures for the cooling of isotope payloads for all
phases of the Shuttle mission (no identifiable failure modes or provide redun-
dant cooling systems).
o oRO-102 Provide procedures to assure isotope heat source cooling to 420 K (300 F)
or less during prelaunch.
RO-103 Minimize overflight of land and continental shelf areas.
RO-104 Provide suitable personnel exclusion area at the launch and landing sites, (4 km
fall back area and approximately 13 km administrative control zone).
RO-107 Establish emergency procedures and decisions (contingency plans) for emer-
gency situations involving nuclear hardware.
GD-114 Provide a rapid response back-up isotope cooling system at the launch pad
which does not require opening of the Shuttle doors.
GD-115 Provide approximately 300 watts of electrical power (either from the Transfer
Module or the Shuttle).
GD-116 Provide multiple and independent system monitoring and control equipment
with instantaneous and recording outputs for all mission phases.
GD-117 Assure maximum allowable shuttle crew - nuclear payload separation distance.
(IRV should be placed with side-on view to crew locations.)
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GD-119 Provide certified equipment to handle nuclear payloads.
GD-120 Provide dry N purging capability of the Shuttle cargo bay while on the launch
pad.
GD-121 Consider use of Transfer Module integration scheme to reduce and simplify
Shuttle interfaces and to improve safety in handling nuclear payloads.
GD-122 Prevent propellant boil-off and other undesirable gases from entering Shuttle
cargo bay with the doors closed by provision of an environmental enclosure.
GD-123 Provide multiple and independent radiation monitoring equipment with instantaneous
and recording outputs.
GD-124 Provide capability of detecting and alerting the Shuttle crew of nuclear payload
failures which occur during transport.
GD-125 Provide a free, unobstructed, and directed ejection path for the payload in the
event of a Shuttle booster or orbiter explosion on the launch pad.
GD-126 Provide intact reentry and impact capability. Consider use of crush-up ma-
terials in Shuttle orbiter cargo bay to minimize damage upon Shuttle land
impact. .
GD-127 Provide tracking and recovery devices on nuclear payloads.
GD-128 Provide a clean, smooth surface cargo bay to facilitate decontamination, and
minimize the time required.
GO-116 Provide certified operational plans to: Receive and store isotope fuel capsules,
load isotope fuel capsules into heat source, install heat source in IRV, and
check out isotope power systems and components.
GO-117 Provide fire alarm and protection system training and procedures capable of
supporting isotope hardware at: Nuclear facility, transporter, and launch pad.
GO-118 Provide quick retrieval operations to remove nuclear payload during an emer-
gency.
GO-119 Install the isotope heat source in the Shuttle cargo bay at the last practicable
point in the launch countdown sequence.
GO-120 Provide capability to reduce ignitable propellant fumes around the cargo bay
(i.e., drainage of propellant tanks and/or purging immediate payload area).
GO-122 Provide Shuttle crew training with confirmed procedures in the use of multiple
and independent system monitoring equipment with instantaneous and recorded
outputs for all mission phases.
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GO-123 Provide certified removal equipment and procedures to handle the nuclear
payload subsequent to Shuttle landing.
GO-124 Provide certified operational plans to retrieve and recover IRV and/or small
isotope sources.
GO-125 Provide support personnel and Shuttle crew training with confirmed procedures
in the use of multiple and independent radiation monitoring equipment with
instantaneous and recorded outputs.
GO-126 Provide recovery gear and procedures for use subsequent to prelaunch accidents.
GO-127 Provide operations in the use of Transfer Modules to protect and reduce handling
and packaging requirements of nuclear pay loads.
GO-128 Provide Shuttle radiation and liquid metal decontamination capability at the
launch and landing sites.
GO-129 Provide emergency capability and procedures for ejection of the payload over
deep ocean areas (or continental shelf) or possible ditching of the Shuttle.
GO-130 Provide tracking and location capability for early land and water recovery.
GO-131 Provide for emergency retrieval/recovery of nuclear equipment if jettisoned
from the Space Shuttle.
GO-132 Provide trained impact/recovery team and procedures for: Recovery, fire pro-
tection, radiation control, and decontamination.
GO-133 Prohibit launch during unsatisfactory weather conditions, including moderate to
high winds blowing towards populated areas.
GO-134 Minimize the crew dose rate throughout all operations (maximum of 150 mrem/
day).
GO-135 Minimize radiation dose to crews performing contingency operations (maximum
of 150 mrem/day from nuclear sources should be maintained).
GO-136 Consider use of a back-up Shuttle to support repair of a failed Shuttle or transfer
or retrieval of the payload in orbit for the continuance of the mission.
GO-137 Provide contingencies for Shuttle orbital stay times of up to 20 days to allow
for repairs to be made.
GO-138 Where in-orbit repairs of interfacing non-nuclear hardware (transfer mechan-
isms, etc.) are unsuccessful, the Shuttle and payload should return to earth.
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GO-139 Consider payload ejection through cargo bay doors if doors cannot be opened.
GO-140 Provide certified operational plans to launch and perform orbital transfer oper-
ations involving nuclear hardware.
GO-141 Provide positive control of nuclear payloads during all handling operations.
GO-142 Provide nuclear cargo transfer operations that do not involve EVA.
GO-143 Provide direct visual or TV coverage of all nuclear cargo transfer operations.
GO-144 Provide alternate and/or redundant equipment and procedures for nuclear
cargo handling.
GO-145 Consider feasibility of uncooperative "tumbling" power module retrieval with
Shuttle.
GO-146 Provide Shuttle landing area remote from inhabited facilities.
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SHUTTLE-GUIDE LINE STATEMENTS
RD-103 Provide a redundant active isotope cooling system with the Shuttle cargo bay
to be operable on ascent and return/reentry with at least 24 hours emergency
operating time.
RO-103 Minimize overflight of land and continental shelf areas.
RO-106 Provide for Shuttle retrieval and recovery of a heat source with a damaged
shield or fuel capsule fractures.
RO-107 Establish emergency procedures and decisions (contingency plans) for
emergency situations involving nuclear hardware.
GD-101 Provide an inert gas blanket and/or double containment during the prelaunch
period to preclude a NaK-oxygen reaction in the event of NaK leak.
GD-104 Provide blast overpressure and fragmentation protection adequate to assure
containment of all radioactive material in event of an accident (critical require-
ment for isotopes; may be desirable for reactors)
GD-105 Provide multiple and independent system monitoring and control equipment
with instantaneous and recording outputs for all mission phases.
GD-107 Provide up to 1 kilowatt of electrical power (either from the Transfer Module
or the Shuttle).
GD-108 Assure maximum allowable shuttle crew-nuclear pay load separation distance
(e.g., provide for the placement of the reactor/shield as far aft in the cargo
bay as premitted within shuttle c. g. and power module configuration restrictions).
r
GD-110 Provide for decay heat removal and radiation shielding if a spent reactor is
transferred to the Shuttle less than 10 days after shutdown.
GD-111 Provide capability of detecting and alerting the Shuttle crew of a liquid metal
leak which would render the power module inoperable and provide potential
hazards within the Shuttle cargo bay.
GD-112 Consider provision of liquid metal fire suppression material within the Shuttle.
GD-113 Consider a Shuttle return of only a reactor/shield by a design which permits
in-orbit separation of the radiator and other components.
GD-114 Provide a rapid response back-up isotope cooling system at the launch pad
which does not require opening of the Shuttle doors.
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GD-115 Provide approximately 300 watts of electrical power (either from the Transfer
Module or the Shuttle).
GD-116 Provide multiple and independent system monitoring and control equipment
with instantaneous and recording outputs for all mission phases.
GD-117 Assure maximum allowable shuttle crew - nuclear payload separation distance.
(IRV should be placed with side-on view to crew locations.)
GD-120 Provide dry N9 purging capability of the Shuttle cargo bay while on the launch
pad.
GD-121 Consider use of Transfer Module integration scheme to reduce and simplify
Shuttle interfaces and to improve safety in handling nuclear payloads.
GD-122 Prevent propellant boil-off and other undesirable gases from entering Shuttle
cargo bay with the doors closed by provision of an environmental enclosure.
GD-123 Provide multiple and independent radiation monitoring equipment with instan-
taneous and recording outputs.
GD-124 . Provide capability of detecting and alerting the Shuttle crew of nuclear payload
failures which occur during transport.
GD-125 Provide a free, unobstructed, and directed ejection path for the payload in the
event of a Shuttle booster or orbiter explosion on the launch pad.
GD 126 Provide intact reentry and impact capability. Consider use of crush-up
materials in Shuttle orbiter cargo bay to minimize damage upon Shuttle land
impact.
GD-127 Provide tracking and recovery devices on nuclear payloads.
GD-128 Provide a clean, smooth surface cargo bay to facilitate decontamination, and
minimize the time required.
GO-104 Provide a controlled environmental liquid metal safing capability at launch
and landing sites (reduction of O sources).
Lt
GO-107 Provide Shuttle crew training with confirmed procedures in the use of multiple
and independent system monitoring equipment with instantaneous and recorded
outputs for all mission phases.
GO-108 Provide rendezvous and docking positions such that the Shuttle crew locations
are within the shadow of the reactor shield to minimize the dose to the crew
during docking and replacement operations.
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GO-110 Provide certified operational plans to dispose of or recover a spent reactor
power module.
GO-111 Provide a minimum 100 year orbital lifetime for a spent reactor in high earth
orbit (250 year orbit is preferred to give 9 half-life decay).
GO-112 Consider capability to install a replaceable or strap-on reactor disposal
system by the Shuttle crew.
GO-115 Consider reactor reboost capability to a new long-life orbit by the Shuttle.
GO-120 Provide capability to reduce ignitable propellant fumes around the cargo bay
(i. e., drainage of propellant tanks and/or purging immediate payload area).
GO-122 Provide Shuttle crew training with confirmed procedures in the use of multiple
and independent system monitoring equipment with instantaneous and recorded
outputs for all mission phases.
GO-124 Provide certified operational plans to retrieve and recover IRV and/or small
isotope sources.
GO-125 Provide support personnel and Shuttle crew training with confirmed procedures
in the use of multiple and independent radiation monitoring equipment with
instantaneous and recorded outputs.
GO-127 Provide operations in the use of Transfer Modules to protect and reduce
handling and packaging requirements of nuclear payloads.
GO-128 Provide Shuttle radiation and liquid metal decontamination capability at the
launch and landing sites.
GO-129 Provide emergency capability and procedures for ejection of the payload over
deep ocean areas (or continental shelf) or possible ditching of the Shuttle.
GO-131 Provide for emergency retrieval/recovery of nuclear equipment if jettisoned
from the Space Shuttle.
GO-134 Minimize the crew dose rate throughout all operations (maximum of 150 mrem/
day).
GO-135 Minimize radiation dose to crews performing contingency operations (maximum
of 150 mrem/day from nuclear sources should be maintained).
GO-136 Consider use of a back-up Shuttle to support repair of a failed Shuttle or transfer
or retrieval of the payload in orbit for the continuance of the mission.
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GO-137 Provide contingencies for Shuttle orbital stay times of up to 20 days to allow
for repairs to be made.
GO-138 Where in-orbit repairs of interfacing non-nuclear hardware (transfer mechanisms,
etc.) are unsuccessful, the Shuttle and payload should return to earth.
GO-139 Consider payload ejection through cargo bay doors if doors cannot be opened.
GO-140 Provide certified operational plans to launch and perform orbital transfer
operations involving nuclear hardware.
GO-141 Provide positive control of nuclear payloads during all handling operations.
GO-142 Provide nuclear cargo transfer operations that do not involve EVA.
GO-143 Provide direct visual or TV coverage of all nuclear cargo transfer operations.
GO-144 Provide alternate and/or redundant equipment and procedures for nuclear
cargo handling.
GO-145 Consider feasibility of uncooperative "tumbling" power module retrieval with
Shuttle.
GO-147 Consider dumping of excess Shuttle propellant prior to landing to minimize
explosive potential.
GO-148 Provide capability to defuel the Shuttle in nuclear emergencies on the launch
pad.
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GROUND SUPPORT-GUIDELINE STATEMENTS
RD-102 Provide passive cooling systems, or redundant active systems, throughout all
phases of the Shuttle-isotope heat source mission.
RO-101 Provide and confirm procedures for the cooling of isotope payloads for all
phases of the Shuttle mission (no identifiable failure modes or provide
redundant cooling systems).
RO-104 Provide suitable personnel exclusion area at the launch and landing sites,
(4 km fallback area and approximately 13 km administrative control zone).
RO-107 Establish emergency procedures and decisions (contingency plans) for
emergency situations involving nuclear hardware.
GD-114 Provide a rapid response back-up isotope cooling system at the launch pad
which does not require opening of the Shuttle doors.
GD-119 Provide certified equipment to handle nuclear payloads.
GD-120 Provide dry N2 purging capability of the Shuttle cargo bay while on the
launch pad.
GD-125 Provide a free, unobstructed, and directed ejection path for the pay load in the
event of a Shuttle booster or orbiter explosion on the launch pad.
GO-101 Provide certified operational plans to store reactor power systems and check
out reactor power systems and components.
GO-102 Provide fire alarm and protection system training and procedures capable of
supporting hardware containing nuclear material and liquid metals in
nuclear facility, transporter and launch pad.
GO-104 Provide a controlled environment liquid metal safing capability at launch and
landing sites (reduction of O sources).
£t
GO-105 Provide certified unloading, decontamination and liquid metal equipment and
procedures to handle nuclear reactor power modules subsequent to Shuttle
landing. *
GO-114 Consider means of long term tracking of reactor power module following boost
to a high earth disposal orbit (for possible recovery at a later date).
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GO-116 Provide certified operational plans to receive and store isotope fuel capsule,
load isotope fuel capsules into heat source, install heat source in LRV and
check out isotope power systems and components.
GO-117 Provide fire alarm and portection system training and procedures capable of
supporting isotope hardware at nuclear facility, transporter and launch pad.
GO-118 Provide quick retrieval operations to remove nuclear payload during an
emergency.
GO-119 Install the isotope heat source in the Shuttle cargo bay at the last practicable
point in the launch coundown sequence.
GO-123 Provide certified removal equipment and procedures to handle the nuclear
payload subsequent to Shuttle landing.
GO-126 Provide recovery gear and procedures for use subsequent to prelaunch
accidents.
GO-128 Provide Shuttle radiation and liquid metal decontamination capability at the
launch and landing sites.
GO-132 Provide trained impact/recovery team and procedures for: recovery, fire
protection, radiation control and decontamination.
GO-133 Prohibit launch during unsatisfactory weather condition, including moderate
to high winds blowing towards populated areas.
GO-146 Provide Shuttle landing area remote from inhabited facilities.
GO-148 Provide capability to defuel the Shuttle in nuclear emergencies on the launch
pad.
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s.
FACILITY-GUIDELINE STATEMENTS
GD-129 Provide certified facilities to store reactor power modules, checkout reactor
power modules and components and perform radiological monitoring and control
functions.
GD-130 Provide certified facilities to store isotope fuel capsules, load isotope fuel
capsules into heat sources, install heat source in IRV, checkout isotope power
systems and components and perform radiological monitoring and control
functions.
GO-104 Provide a controlled environment liquid metal safing capability at launch and
landing sites (reduction of O sources).
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Table 4-2. Shuttle Nuclear System Safety
Guideline Cross Index
NUMBER
REQUIREMENTS 1
DESIGN
RD101
RD102
RD103
RD104
RD105
OPERATIONS
R0101
RO102
RO103
RO104
RO105
RO106
RO107
GUIDELINES 1
DESIGN
GD101
GD102
GD103
GD104
GD105
GD106
GD107
GD108
GD109
GD110
GD111
GD112
GD113
GD114
GD115
GD116
GDI 17
GD118
GD119
GD120
GD121
GD122
GD123
GD124
GD125
GD126
GD127
GD128
GD129
GD130
TITLE
ON PAD COOLING OF ISOTOPE HEAT SOURCE
ISOTOPE COOLING SYSTEMS
ISOTOPE COOLING DURING SHUTTLE TRANSPORT
BLAST AND FRAGMENTATION PROTECTION (ISOTOPE)
FIREBALL PROTECTION
PROCEDURES TO ASSURE ISOTOPE COOLING
ISOTOPE HEAT SOURCE COOLING PROCEDURES FOR PRELAUNCH
LAND AND CONTINENTAL SHELF OVERFLIGHT
PERSONNEL EXCLUSION AREA
PERMANENT REACTOR SHUTDOWN OPERATIONS
ISOTOPE RETRIEVAL/RECOVERY
CONTINGENCY PLANS
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
INERT GAS PRESSURE LINER
DOUBLE CONTAINMENT
BLAST AND FRAGMENTATION PROTECTION (REACTOR)
PAYLOAD STATUS MONITORING EQUIPMENT
NaK LOOP INTEGRITY
AUXILIARY ELECTRIC POWER - REACTOR PAYLOAD
SHUTTLE CREW - NUCLEAR PAYLOAD SEPARATION (REACTOR)
DESIGN OF SEPARABLE REACTOR/SHIELD ASSEMBLY
SPENT REACTOR DECAY HEAT REMOVAL AND RADIATION PROTECTION
DETECTION OF NaK LEAK IN CARGO BAY
LIQUID METAL FIRE SUPPRESSION
REACTOR DISPOSAL/RECOVERY
ON-PAD ISOTOPE COOLING
AUXILIARY POWER - ISOTOPE PAYLOAD
PAYLOAD STATUS MONITORING EQUD7MENT
SHUTTLE CREW - NUCLEAR PAYLOAD'SEPABATION (ISOTOPE)
FLOTATION GEAR
PAYLOAD HANDLING
ON-PAD NITROGEN PURGING OF CARGO BAY
TRANSFER MODULE INTEGRATION SCHEME
SHUTTLE ENVIRONMENTAL ENCLOSURE
RADIATION MONITORING EQUIPMENT
DETECTION OF NUCLEAR PAYLOAD FAILURES DURING TRANSPORT
DIRECTED EJECTION OF PAYLOAD
INTACT REENTRY AND IMPACT CAPABILITY OF NUCLEAR PAYLOAD
TRACKING AND RECOVERY DEVICES FOR NUCLEAR PAYLOAD
SHUTTLE DECONTAMINATION
NUCLEAR FACILITIES (REACTOR)
NUCLEAR FACILITIES (ISOTOPE)
APPLICABLE SYSTEMS
REACTOR
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
mv
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
SMALL
ISOTOPE
SOURCES
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
SHUTTLE
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
GROUND
SUPPORT
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
FACILITIES
X
X
NUJIBER
OPERATIONS
GO101
G0102
GO103
GO104.
G0105
GO106
GO107
GO108
GO109
GO110
GO111
G0112
GO113
GO114
GO115
GO116
GO117
GO118
GO119
G0120
GO121
GO122
G0123
GO124
GO125
G0126
GO127
GO128
GO129
GO130
GO131
G0132
GO133
GO134
GO135
GO136
GO137
GO138
GOI39
GO140
GO141
G0142
GO143
GO144
GO145
GO146
GO147
GO148
TITLE 1
NUCLEAR OPERATIONAL PLANS (REACTOR
FIRE ALARM AND PROTECTION (REACTOR)
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION OPERATIONS
LIQUID METAL SAFING CAPABILITY
PAYLOAD REMOVAL (REACTOR) ,'
NaK LOOP INTEGRITY DURING ORBITAL OPERATIONS
PAYLOAD STATUS MONITORING PROCEDURES
USE OF SHADOW SHIELDING DURING TRANSFER OPERATIONS
SPENT REACTOR HANDLING
DISPOSAL/RECOVERY OPERATIONS
REACTOR DISPOSAL ALTITUDE
REACTOR DISPOSAL SYSTEM INSTALLATION BY SHUTTLE
SEPARATION OF R/S ASSEMBLY FROM PCS i
TRACKING OF SPENT REACTOR POWER MODULE i
REACTOR DISPOSAL TO HIGH EARTH ORBIT 'i
NUCLEAR OPERATIONAL PLANS (ISOTOPE)
FIRE ALARM AND PROTECTION (ISOTOPE)
QUICK RETRIEVAL OPERATIONS INVOLVING ISOTOPE PAYLOADS
ISOTOPE HEAT SOURCE INSTALLATION IN SHUTTLE
IGNITION POTENTIAL ON LAUNCH PAD
CREW OPERATIONS IN VICINITY OF IRV
PAYLOAD STATUS MONITORING PROCEDURES
PAYLOAD REMOVAL (ISOTOPE) j
RETRIEVAL/RECOVERY OPERATIONS (ISOTOPE)
RADIATION MONITORING PROCEDURES |
RECOVERY GEAR AND PROCEDURES
TRANSFER MODULE OPERATIONS \
SHUTTLE DECONTAMINATION j
PAYLOAD EJECTION
TRACKING AND LOCATION AIDS
EMERGENCY PAYLOAD RETRIEVAL/RECOVERY '
IMPACT/RECOVERY TEAM
WEATHER RESTRICTIONS
NUCLEAR RADIATION PROTECTION
NUCLEAR RADIATION PROTECTION DURING CONTINGENCIES
BACK-UP SHUTTLE CAPABILITY
EXTENDED ORBITAL STAY -TIME
IN-ORBIT REPAYS
EMERGENCY PAYLOAD EJECTION THROUGH CARGO BAY DC
LAUNCH AND IN-ORBIT TRANSFER OPERATIONS (REACTOR)
NUCLEAR CARGO TRANSFER
NUCLEAR CARGO TRANSFER OPERATIONS
ORS
NUCLEAR CARGO TRANSFER VISIBILITY
ALTERNATE PAYLOAD HANDLING OPERATIONS
EMERGENCY IN-ORBIT RETRIEVAL
SHUTTLE LANDING AREA
DUMPING OF EXCESS SHUTTLE PROPELLANT
SHUTTLE DE FUELING
APPLICABLE SYSTEMS
'
REACTOR
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
mv
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
SMALL
ISOTOPE
SOURCES
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
SHUTTLE
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
GROUND
SUPPORT
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
FACILITIES
X
4-27/28
SECTION 5
SAFETY GUIDELINES
This section contains the complete set of guidelines and requirements arranged in the
following order:
Requirements
Design Requirements RD-101 - RD-105
Operations Requirements RO-101 - RO-107
Guidelines
Design Guidelines GD-101 - GD-130
Operations Guidelines GO-101 - GO-148
5-1/2
SPACE SHUTTLE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
RD-101
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Shuttle
SYSTEM—SUBSYSTEM
IRV, Small Isotope Source
OPERATION
Isotope Cooling at Launch Pad
MISSION PHASE/EVENT
Prelaunch
TITLE: ON PAD COOLING OF ISOTOPE HEAT SOURCE
STATEMENT: Provide isotope heat source cooling to 420°K (300°F), or less.
JUSTIFICATION : On a standard day at sea level, the radiating surface of the isotope heat
source will reach an equilibrium temperature of 867°K (1100°F). This would present a
hazard in the presence of hydrazine and other booster fuels, and would also cause struc-
tural damage to the heat source and fuel capsules due to refractory alloy oxidation.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS : Cooling during prelaunch can be accomplished by pumping cold nitrogen or some
other cryogenic fluid over the heat source. The cold nitrogen would be supplied by existing
Ground Support Equipment (GSE) located in the Mobile Launcher.
REFERENCES:
72SD4201-4-1 Section 4, 5, Appendix C
CROSS REFERENCES:
GD-114
RD-102
RO-102
SPACE SHUTTLE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
RD-102
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Shuttle
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
LRV. Small Isotope Sources,
Ground Support
OPERATION
Isotope Cooling
MISSION PHASE/EVENT
Prelaunch, Launch/Ascent, On-Orbit Operations, End of Mission
TITLE: ISOTOPE COOLING SYSTEMS
STATEMENT: Provide passive cooling systems, or redundant active systems, throughout
all phases of the Shuttle-isotope heat source mission.
JUSTIFICATION: An isotope heat source provides a continuous flow of heat energy and . .
radiation throughout its lifetime. The heat must be removed in a manner that maintains
the temperature of the heat source and nearby equipment at acceptably low levels. In-
adequate heat removal will result in excessive temperatures that can render equipment
unoperative and the heat source capsule unable to contain the isotope fuel.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS: During the prelaunch period, the heat source is cooled to about 420°K with a flow
of cold nitrogen which is supplied by GSE located in the Mobile Launcher. During orbital
and reentry phases of the mission, cooling of the heat source must be accomplished by
other means. Either a passive or active thermal control system can be employed, de-
pending to a large extent upon the type of environmental shielding. If a hemispherical
environmental shield is used, passive cooling (direct radiation to space) can be employed
once the Shuttle is out of the earth's atmosphere and the Shuttle doors opened. During
reentry operations when the Shuttle doors are closed, cooling of the heat source to an
acceptable temperature of perhaps 650° or 700°K can be accomplished by a low tempera-
ture nitrogen system similar to that used during prelaunch, but carried aboard the Shuttle
A water boil-off system could also be used to reduce the heat source temperature. Upon
landing, the heat source could once again be cooled by GSE. if a 4?r environmental shield
is employed, cooling could be accomplished by a redundant cold gas system, or by a
pumped loop, rejecting the heat to space by means of a radiator mounted externally on
the Shuttle. During reentry, a cold gas or water boil-off system must be relied upon.
For small isotope systems, cooling requirements during prelaunch of less than 420°K
sttll exist, but the thermal output may be low enough to negate the need for auxiliary
cooling.
REFERENCES:
72SD4201-4-1 Section 4, 5; Appendix C
72SD4201-2-1 Section 5
CROSS REFERENCES:
GO-119 KD-101
KD-103
GD-114
SPACE SHUTTLE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
RD-103
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Shuttle
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
IRV, Small Isotope Sources,
Shuttle
OPERATION
Isotope Cooling Contingencies
MISSION PHASE/fe
Launch/Ascent,On-Orbit Operations .End of Mission
TITLE: ISOTOPE COOLING DURING SHUTTLE TRANSPORT
STATEMENT.- Provide a. redundant active isotope cooling system within tiie Shuttle cargo bay
to be operable on ascent and return/reentry with at least 24 hours emergency operating
time.
JUSTIFICATION : One of the large potential hazards that arises when transporting an isotope
heat source is the constant emission of heat. This heat energy must be removed to prevent
excessive temperatures that can render equipment unoperative and the heat source capsule
unable to contain the isotope fuel. To maintain allowable temperatures during the ascent
and on-orbit operations, the heat source may be capable of radiating directly to space with
the cargo bay doors open however, during reentry when the cargo bay doors are closed,
provisions must be made for a redundant active cooling system with a 24 hour emergency
operating capability. This redundant active cooling system should also be provided for
during ascent and on-orbit operations to serve as a back-up if the Shuttle cargo bay doors
fail to open. (For small isotope sources, cooling requirements during prelaunch
of less than 420°K still exist but the thermal output may be low enough to negate
the need for auxiliary cooling. However, in the event of a contingency situation,
a redundant active cooling system could be employed.)
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS : cold gas system or a water boil-off system should be considered. A pumped
loop system using perhaps an organic fluid and rejecting the heat to space by means of a
radiator mounted externally on the Shuttle orbiter can be used during ascent and orbital
operations, but cannot be used during reentry when high Shuttle skin temperatures exist.
However, suitable controls can permit the pumped loop to act as a water boil-off system
when desired.
REFERENCES:
72SD4201-4-1 Section 4,5, 6; Appendix C
CROSS REFERENCES:
RD-102
SPACE SHUTTLE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
RD-104
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Shuttle
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
IRV, Small Isotope Sources
OPERATION
Shuttle Transport
MISSION PHASE
Prelaunch, Launch/Ascent, End of Mission
TITLE: BLAST AND FRAGMENTATION PROTECTION (ISOTOPE)
STATEMENT.- Provide blast overpressure and fragmentation protection adequate to assure
containment of all radioactive material in event of an accident (critical requirement for
isotopes; may be desirable for reactors).
JUSTIFICATION : The proximity of the isotope payload in the Shuttle cargo bay to the Shuttle
fuel tankage will result in extremely high blast overpressures and fragment velocities in
the event of a tankage explosion. To prevent breaking of the nuclear fuel capsules and the
release of radioactive material to the environment, extensive shielding will be required".
(The size and weight of blast and fragmentation shielding for small isotope sources will
be minor compared to that for an IRV.)
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS: Three possible approaches to the design of an environmental shield (protection of
heat source capsules from the blast overpressure, high velocity fragments, and fireball
temperatures that might ensue in the event of an explosion of the Shuttle main tankage) are:
• Hemispherical environmental shield-interface shielding between the heat source
and Shuttle tankage; permits passive thermal control
• 4w environmental-heat source is completely protected by shielding
• Augmented hemispherical shield-shielding nearly encompasses the heat source,
but has an opening (away from probable source of explosion) that permits radiation
of sufficient heat to maintain acceptable heat source temperatures.
An alternative approach that permits the use of lighter and simpler environmental shielding
is to increase the separation distance between the heat source and the source of explosion.
Blast overpressure and fragment velocities are rapidly reduced as the separation distance
increases. To achieve this, the heat source could be transported in a pod mounted exter-
nally on the Shuttle, or it might even be located in the nose of the Shuttle.
REFERENCES:
72SD4201-4-1 Section 4, 5; Appendix A
72SD4201-4-2 Appendix A
CROSS REFERENCES:
GD-104
RD-105
SPACE SHUTTLE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
RD-105
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Shuttle
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Reactor, IRV, Small Isotope
Sources
OPERATION
Shuttle Transport
MISSION PHASE/fcVENT
Prelaunch, Launch/Ascent, End of Mission
TITLE: FIREBALL PROTECTION
STATEMENT : Provide fireball protection adequate to assure containment of all radioactive
material in event of an accident (critical for isotopes; may be necessary for reactors).
JUSTIFICATION : Fireball temperatures in the aftermath of a launch pad Shuttle explosion are
expected to reach a maximum temperature of approximately 2980°K (4900°F) immediately
after the explosion and level off to approximately 1250°K (1800°F) within 10-14 seconds
following the explosion. The isotope fuel capsules or fuel elements of a nuclear reactor
must be designed to survive this thermal environment without releasing any radioactive
material to the atmosphere or environmental shielding must be provided to perform this
function.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS: Fireball protection is critical for isotope payloads with inherently large curie
inventories that could be released, whereas the fireball protection requirement is not as
critical for a reactor system because of the small core fission product inventory (generated
during preflight low power acceptance testing) that exists prior to reactor startup in orbit.
However, if the reactor system is to be returned to earth following in-orbit power
operation, fireball protection must be provided because of the potentially large core fission
product inventory generated during the reactor's operational lifetime.
REFERENCES:
72SD4201-4-1 Section 3,4, 5; Appendix A
72SD4201-4-2 Appendix A
CROSS REFERENCES:
RD-104
SPACE SHUTTLE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
RO-101
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Shuttle
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
IRV, Small Isotope Sources,
OPERATION
Isotope Cooling
MISSION PHASE/EVENT
Prelaunch, Launch/Ascent, On-Orbit Operations, End of Mission
TITLE: PROCEDURES TO ASSURE ISOTOPE COOLING
STATEMENT: Provide and confirm procedures for the cooling of isotope payloads for all
phases of the Shuttle mission (no identifiable failure modes or provide redundant cooling
systems).
JUSTIFICATION : The isotope payload generates heat throughout its useful lifetime. The heat
must be removed in a fashion that maintains fuel capsule and surrounding equipment tem-
peratures within acceptable limits; failure to do so can result in equipment breakdowns,
fuel capsule failures, and a possibility of increased fuel dispersion in the event of a sub-
sequent accident and independent reentry. Equipment and procedures aboard the Shuttle
must remove the heat generated, and must indicate that allowable temperatures exist.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS: During a normal launch/ascent, the heat generated by the isotope fuel is largely
taken up by the heat source structure. The temperature of the device increases only
slightly from the 420°K to which it is cooled prior to launch during the approximately eight
minutes required to penetrate the earth's atmosphere. After this time, the Shuttle cargo
bay doors can be opened and the heat source can radiate directly to space. The IRV heat
source temperature will rise slowly to its equilibrium temperature of 865°K.
During reentry at the end of mission when the IRV is being returned to earth, a redundant
active system should be capable of providing cooling. Prior to actual removal of the IRV
from the cargo bay following landing, inert gas cooling will be introduced to cool the heat
source, using the same inert gas cooling systems that cooled the heat source prior to lift-
off. For small isotope systems, prelaunch cooling requirements of less than 420°K still
exist, but the thermal output may be low enough to negate the need for auxiliary cooling.
REFERENCES:
72SD4201-2-1 Section 5
72SD4201-4-1 Section 4,5; Appendix C
CROSS REFERENCES:
RD-102
SPACE SHUTTLE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
RO-102
PROGRAM EUEMENT
Shuttle
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
IRV, Small Isotope Source
OPERATION
Launch Pad Cooling
MISSION PHASE /EVENT
Prelaunch
TITLE: ISOTOPE HEAT SOURCE COOLING PROCEDURES FOR PRELAUNCH
STATEMENT: Provide procedures to assure isotope heat source cooling to 420 K (300 F)
or less during prelaunch.
JUSTIFICATION : On a standard day at sea level, the radiating surface of the isotope heat
source will reach an equilibrium temperature of 867°K (1100°F). This would present a
hazard in the presence of hydrazine and other booster fuels and would also cause structural
damage to the heat source and fuel capsules due refractory alloy oxidation. For small
isotope sources, the cooling requirements of less than 420°K still exist, but the thermal
output may be low enough to negate the need for auxiliary cooling.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS: Cooling during prelaunch can be accomplished by pumping cold nitrogen or some
other cryogenic fluid over the heat source. The cold nitrogen would be supplied by GSE
located in the Mobile Launcher.
REFERENCES:
72SD4201-4-1 Section 4, 5; Appendix C
CROSS REFERENCES:
RD-101
GD-114
SPACE SHUTTLE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
RO-103
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Shuttle I
SYSTE M- SU BSYSTE M
Reactor, IRV, Small Isotope
Sources. Shuttle
OPERATION '
Shuttle Transport
MISSION PHASE/EVENT
Launch/Ascent
TITLE; LAND AND CONTINENTAL SHELF OVERFLIGHT
STATEMENT : Minimize overflight of land and continental shelf areas.
JUST 11=-icATiON : The hazard association with earth impact of a nuclear payload is greatly
reduced if it occurs in a deep ocean area where the population exposure is the smallest
and the payload can sink to the ocean bottom. Therefore, the mission should be planned to
minimize land and continental shelf overflight during launch/ascent and during descent/
^reentry operations.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS :
REFERENCES:
72SD4201-4-1 Section 3, 4, 5,7
72SD4201-4-2 Section 4
CROSS REFERENCES:
SPACE SHUTTLE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
RO-104
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Shuttle
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Reactor, IRV, Small Isotope
Sources, Ground Support
OPERATION
Shuttle Launch/Landing
MISSION PHASE/EVENT
Prelaunch, Launch/Ascent, End of Mission
TITLE: PERSONNEL EXCLUSION AREA
STATEMENT.- Provide suitable personnel exclusion area at the launch and landing sites,
(4 km fallback area and approximately 13 km administrative control zone).
JUSTIFICATION : An on-pad accident could result in the release of radioactive material in the
immediate vicinity of the launch pad. To prevent the ground crew and observers from being
exposed to a potential nuclear hazard, provisions must be made for maintaining suitable
personnel exclusion area surrounding the launch site during the fueling and countdown
operations.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS: The 4 km fallback distance is based on the locus of isopleths (0.15 rem whole
body dose which is equivalent to the yearly natural background level) from a 100 MW-sec
reactor excursion on the launch pad for Pasquill F weather (worst case). The isopleths are
within the KSC boundary and do not extend to the Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB) and
Launch Control Center where launch control and observers are located.
The currently controlled area at KSC with a radius of about 13 km appears to be adequate
for missions involving nuclear hardware. This is the area within which all personnel are
under direct administrative control. The 13 km radius from the perimeter of nuclear
facilities remains within the boundaries of KSC and the Eastern Test Range.
REFERENCES:
72SD4201-4-1 Section 3,4, 5,7
72SD4201-4-2 Section 4
CROSS REFERENCES:
SPACE SHUTTLE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
RO-105
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Shuttle
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Reactor
OPERATION
Reactor Disposal
MISSION PHASE/EVENT
End of Mission
TITLE: PERMANENT REACTOR SHUTDOWN OPERATIONS
STATEMENT : Provide procedures for permanent reactor shutdown prior to separation
from Space Base.
JUSTIFICATION : It is conceivable that a reactor upon impacting the earth's surface could go
critical due to a combination of control drum motion and core compaction (land impact) or
over moderation caused by water reflection of neutrons (water immersion). To prevent
such an occurrence and eliminate the nuclear hazards involved, permanent reactor shut-
down should be provided.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS : Control drum lockouts and core poisons are possible permanent shutdown
mechanisms. A third approach is to force the hydrogen moderator out of the fuel elements.
This can be done by reducing the coolant flow, thereby increasing the core temperature
enough to induce fuel cladding failure.
REFERENCES:
72SD4201-4-1 Section 3,7; Appendix B
72SD4201-4-2 Section 2
CROSS REFERENCES:
SPACE SHUTTLE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
RO-106
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Shuttle
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
IRV, Shuttle
OPERATION
Contingencies
MISSION PHASE/EVENT
On-Orbit Operations, End of Mission
TITLE: ISOTOPE RETRIEVAL/RECOVERY
STATEMENT : Provide for Shuttle retrieval and recovery of a heat source with a damaged
shield or fuel capsule fractures.
JUSTIFICATION: As a back-up recovery mode, the isotope reentry vehicle (IRV) has its own
reentry protection to assure a successful independent reentry of the heat source. This
back-up recovery mode should be particularly avoided if fuel capsule fractures are present
or if the reentry shield is damaged. If these conditions exist, there is a high probability
that upon reentry, a fuel release will occur. Therefore, the Shuttle should be considered
as the prime mode of retrieval/recovery of an isotope heat source with a damaged shield
or fuel capsule fractures.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS : With a failure in fuel capsule containment, the resultant radiation due to release
of fines should not be a hazard to the crew, but a thorough decontamination of the Shuttle
cargo bay upon landing will be required. Clean, smooth cargo bay surfaces, free from
protrusions and crevices would enhance decontamination procedures. A sealed crew
compartment (separate ECLS) should be a design objective to assure radioactive vapor
from fractured capsules does not enter the compartment.
REFERENCES:
72SD4201-4-1 Section 6
CROSS REFERENCES:
GO-124
GD-128
SPACE SHUTTLE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
RO-107
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Shuttle
SYSTEM- SUBSYSTEM OPERATION
Reactor, IRV, Small Isotope
Sources, Shuttle. Ground Suppor Contingencies
MISSION PHASE/EVENT
Prelaunch, Launch/Ascent, On-Orbit Operations, End of Mission
TITLE: CONTINGENCY PLANS
STATEMENT .- Establish emergency procedures and decisions (contingency plans) for
emergency situations involving nuclear hardware.
JUSTIFICATION : Abnormal and/or emergency situations involving nuclear payloads could
result during the mission. If remedial steps are not taken in these situations, the mission
could be curtailed and potential hazards to the crew, equipment, the general public, and
the ecology could result. The implementation of contingency modes and emergency opera-
ting procedures could eliminate or substantially reduce the adverse effects on the mission
and the risks to personnel.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS : The results of a qualitative contingency analysis of Shuttle/nuclear payload
transport missions indicate that the implementation of emergency procedures is effective
for three situations: (1) where remedial actions contain and control the emergency situation
and normal operations can be resumed, (2) where a diminished operating mode can be
established until the normal operational conditions are reestablished and (3) where crew
and/or equipment abort procedures can be enacted to effect recovery of the crew and/or
safe disposal or recovery of the nuclear source. Each situation is a deviation from the
normal mode of operations and could require unanticipated implementation.
Effective contingency implementation requires careful planning, procedural preparation,
and training, which must be performed in parallel with hardware design, development,
and mission planning.
REFERENCES:
72SD4201-4-1 Section 3,4,5,6,7
72SD4201-4-2 Section 4
CROSS REFERENCES: RD-103
RD-106
GD-102,103, 111, 112,113,114,
118,120,124,125,126,127,
128
GO-104,112,115,120,128,129,
135,136,137,138,139,145,
147,148
SPACE SHUTTLE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-101
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Shuttle
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Reactor, Shuttle
OPERATION
Shuttle Transport
MISSION PHASE/4vENT
Prelaunch
TITLE*. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
STATEMENT : Provide an inert gas blanket and/or double containment during the prelaunch
period to preclude a NaK-oxygen reaction in the event of NaK leak.
JUSTIFICATION : Reactors that may be transported by the Shuttle use NaK as the heat transfer
medium to remove heat from the reactor core. Some systems also use NaK in the heat
rejection (radiator) loop. Because there is a possibility of a NaK leak, and because NaK
reacts violently with oxygen, an inert gas blanket coupled with double wall containment
must be provided to prevent the presence of moisture and other oxygen sources from
coming in contact with the NaK coolant.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS:
 An ad<jed safety precaution involves sealing off the cargo bay from the rest of the
Shuttle, especially from the LO£ and LH2 vapor boil-off of propellant tanks or fuel cell
storage bottles.
The requirements for an inert gas environmental enclosure are significantly increased if
a liquid metal NaK coolant is used in the primary heat rejection loop rather than an organic
coolant (i.e., Dow Corning 200).
REFERENCES:
72SD4201-4-1 Section 3
CROSS REFERENCES:
GD-102,103,122
GO-103
SPACE SHUTTLE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-102
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Shuttle
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Reactor
OPERATION
Contingencies
MISSION PHASE /4vENT
Prelaunch, Launch/Ascent, On-Orbit Operations, End of Mission
TITLE: INERT GAS PRESSURE LINER
STATEMENT : Consider use of an inert gas positive pressure liner for encasement of all or
portions of a reactor power module - considered particularly important for the in-orbit
retrieval and landing site removal of a damaged power module.
JUSTIFICATION : Reactors that may be transported by the Space Shuttle use NaK as the heat
transfer medium to remove heat from the reactor core. Some systems also use NaK in the
heat rejection (radiator) loop. Because there is a possibility of a NaK leak and because
NaK reacts violently with oxygen, the use of an inert gas positive pressure liner for en-
casement of all or portions of a reactor power module should be considered to protect the
Shuttle cargo bay and provide safety advantages in the unloading and Shuttle refurbishment
operations at the launch/landing site.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS:
inert gag positive pressure liner would be placed around the reactor/shield
assembly or the entire power module prior to or during installation in the cargo bay. This
liner could be designed to contain a NaK leak and also maintain a positive inert gas pressur
until the power module is within the controlled environment of the liquid metal servicing
building.
REFERENCES:
72SD4201-4-1 Section 6
CROSS REFERENCES:
GD-101,103,122
GO-104,105
SPACE SHUTTLE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-103
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Shuttle
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Reactor
OPERATION
Contingencies
MISSION PHASE/EVENT
Prelaunch, Launch/Ascent, On-Orbit Operations, End of Mission
TITLE: DOUBLE CONTAINMENT
STATEMENT : Provide double containment of liquid metal components where feasible.
JUSTIFICATION : Reactors that may be transported by the Space Shuttle use NaK as the heat
transfer medium to remove heat from the reactor core. Some systems also use NaK in the
heat rejection (radiator) loop. Because there is a possibility of a NaK leak and because
NaK reacts violently with oxygen, double wall containment of liquid metal components
should be provided where feasible. !
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS: Another protective device based on the principle of double containment involves
the use of a positive pressure liner which would be placed around the reactor/shield
assembly or the entire power module prior to or during installation in the cargo bay. This
liner could be designed to contain the NaK leak and also maintain a positive inert gas
pressure until the module is within the controlled environment of the liquid metal servicing
facility.
REFERENCES:
72SD4201-4-1 Section 3, 6
CROSS REFERENCES:
GD-101,102
SPACE SHUTTLE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD 104
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Shuttle
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Reactor, Shuttle
OPERATION
Shuttle Transport
MISSION PHASE /4vENT
Prelaunch, Launch/Ascent, End of Mission
TITLE: BLAST AND FRAGMENTATION PROTECTION (REACTOR)
STATEMENT.- Provide blast overpressure and fragmentation protection adequate to assure
containment of all radioactive material in event of an accident (critical requirement for
isotopes; may be desirable for reactors)
JUSTIFICATION .- The proximity of the nuclear reactor payload in the Shuttle cargo bay to the
Shuttle fuel tankage will result in extremely high blast overpressures and fragment
velocities in the event of a tankage explosion. To prevent breaking of the nuclear fuel ele-
ments and the release of radioactive material to the environment, extensive shielding will
be required.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS: Prior to initial reactor startup in orbit, little or no blast and fragmentation pro-
tection will be required due to the small fission product inventory present in the core.
However, following reactor operation in space and the resultant buildup of a relatively large
fission product inventory, blast and fragmentation protection must be provided if the spent
reactor is to be returned to earth.
REFERENCES:
72SD4201-4-1 Section 3, Appendix A
72SD4201-4-2 Appendix A
CROSS REFERENCES:
RD-104
SPACE SHUTTLE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-105
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Shuttle
SYSTE M- SU BSYSTE M
Reactor, Shuttle
OPERATION
Payload Monitoring
MISSION PHASE/EVENT
Prelaunch, Launch/As cent, On-Orbit Operations, End of Mission
TITLE: PAYLOAD STATUS MONITORING EQUIPMENT
STATEMENT : Provide multiple and independent system monitoring and control equipment
with instantaneous and recording outputs for all mission phases.
JUSTIFICATION -. Knowing the condition of the reactor power module within the Shuttle orbiter
cargo bay permits an assessment by the crew of the "go/no-go" status of the payload (1)
prior to launch, (2) prior to final rendezvous and docking, and (3) prior to initiating the re-
entry, final approach and landing upon returning a spent reactor power module to the earth's
surface. A detected failure condition, such as a liquid metal or radiator coolant leak would
eliminate the need for docking and the subsequent removal (from the cargo bay) of a dam-
aged power module. A detected failure condition of the power module which is deemed a
hazard upon landing could result in the emergency ejection of the power module into a deep
ocean area prior to earth landing.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS: Provisions must be made for the recording and/or display of a maximum of 80
data points (sensors) for maintaining periodic and, in some cases, continuous system status
of power module integrity, radiation levels, NaK leaks, power module and cargo bay tem-
peratures, etc. In addition to the monitoring equipment, some 20 separate control signals
are required to provide environmental control regulation, handling, attachment and deploy-
ment controls from the Shuttle.
REFERENCES:
72SD4201-4-1 Section 3
CROSS REFERENCES:
GO-107
GD-111
SPACE SHUTTLE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-106
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Shuttle
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Reactor
OPERATION
In orbit operations,
maintenance
MISSION PHASE/EVENT
On-Orbit Operations
TITLE: NaK LOOP INTEGRITY
STATEMENT : Provide NaK loop design which does not require breaking or opening of NaK
loops for replacement and maintenance.
JUSTIFICATION: NaK, used as the primary coolant in most reactor systems, reacts violently
in the presence of oxygen (which may be leaking or otherwise being discharged from the
Space Base or Space Shuttle) and is very corrosive. If NaK is released in orbit, it may
vaporize and then condense on external surfaces and the vapor could contaminate the
surrounding environment. Therefore, the NaK loops should be designed to retain their
integrity during orbital operations.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS: If NaK loops are broken, an EVA will most likely be required if repair is to be
attempted. Since NaK is probably not compatible with the space suits worn by the
astronauts, EVA may be hazardous.
REFERENCES:
72SD4201-4-1 Section 3, Appendix B
CROSS REFERENCES:
GO-106
SPACE SHUTTLE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-107
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Shuttle
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Reactor, Shuttle
OPERATION
Shuttle Transport
MISSION PHASE/EVENT
Launch/Ascent, On-Orbit Operations, End of Mission
TITLE: AUXILIARY ELECTRIC POWER - REACTOR PAYLOAD
STATEMENT : Provide up to 1 kilowatt of electrical power (either from the Transfer Module
or the Shuttle).
JUSTIFICATION : Reactors that may be transported by the Space Shuttle use NaK as the heat
transfer medium to remove heat from the reactor core. NaK-78 freezes at approximately
260°K (12°F) and is subject to freezing temperatures during launch/ascent and while in
orbit prior to operation. Severe freezing can cause coolant loop damage. Frozen loops
also become difficult to thaw in order to permit circularization and cooling of the reactor.
Up to 200 watts of electrical power may be required to provide radiant heat to prevent NaK
freeze-up.
At the end of mission, if the spent reactor power module is placed in the cargo within
a very few days after shutdown, the fission product afterheat may have to be removed.
Approximately 500 watts of electrical power may be needed for operation of cool-
ant pumps for the removal of fission product decay heat. HAZARDCATEGORY
REMARKS: These electrical power requirements can be substantially reduced if:
• The NaK heating requirement is placed on the Space Base rather than on the
Space Shuttle (NaK would be heated subsequent to mating of the reactor power
module to the Space Base and prior to reactor start-up))
• A short wait time of approximately two days is observed for thermal cooling :
prior to placing the shutdown, spent reactor in the cargo bay.
The electrical power required could be supplied by batteries that are mounted on the
transfer module or by the Space Shuttle Electrical Power System.
REFERENCES:
72SD4201-4-1 Sections
CROSS REFERENCES:
GD-115
SPACE SHUTTLE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-108
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Shuttle
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Reactor, Shuttle
OPERATION
Shuttle Transport
MISSION PHASE
Prelaunch, Launch/Ascent, On-Orbit Operation, End of Mission
TITLE: SHUTTLE CREW - NUCLEAR PAYLOAD SEPARATION (REACTOR)
STATEMENT : Assure maximum allowable shuttle crew-nuclear payload separation distance
(e. g., provide for the placement of the reactor/shield as far aft in the cargo bay as per-
mitted within shuttle c. g. and power module configuration restrictions).
JUSTIFICATION : The maximum allowable dose rate to the Shuttle crew is 150 mrem/day per
study groundrule. This dose rate will not be exceeded when transporting a "clean" reactor
power module that has not been operated; however, when transporting a shutdown, spent
reactor module during the end of mission operations, the 150 mrem/day dose rate will be
exceeded (with no additional gamma shielding) unless the reactor/shield assembly is placed
as far aft in the Shuttle cargo bay as permitted within Shuttle payload center-of-gravity and
power module configuration restrictions. Maximum separation distance will reduce shield-
ing requirements in applications where additional gamma shielding is necessary.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS: Even though Hie maximum allowable Shuttle crew dose rate will not be exceeoea
if a clean reactor power module is transported with the reactor/shield assembly placed
forward in the cargo bay, it is desirable to perform all transport operations with the
reactor/shield assembly positioned aft in the cargo bay as is required if a shutdown, spent
reactor power module. Shuttle transport operations will be simplified by always transport-
ing reactor power modules in tiie same relative position in the cargo bay.
REFERENCES:
72SD4201-4-1 Section 3, Appendix B
CROSS REFERENCES:
GO-109, 135
SPACE SHUTTLE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-109
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Shuttle
SYSTEM—SUBSYSTEM
Reactor
OPERATION
Reactor Disposal
MISSION PHASE
End of Mission
TITLE: DESIGN OF SEPARABLE REACTOR/SHIELD ASSEMBLY
STATEMENT : Consider provision of a reactor/shield assembly separable from the
radiator at end of mission.
JUSTIFICATION : the selected reactor disposal scheme is the placement of the spent
reactor in high earth orbit, its orbital lifetime at a given altitude will increase considerably
as its ballistic coefficient (W/CpA) increases. The ballistic coefficient can be substantially
increased by separating the radiator from the reactor/shield assembly and boosting only the
latter to high earth orbit. This provision eliminates the transport of the radiator back to
the earth via the Shuttle.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS: Separation of the reactor/shield assembly from the rest of the power module can
be accomplished by using a "separable heat exchanger". The separable heat exchanger
permits separation of the reactor, with its primary liquid metal coolant loop, from the
power conversion system and its secondary liquid metal coolant loop, without breaking any
liquid metal coolant lines.
REFERENCES:
72SD4201-4-1 Section 3, Appendix B
CROSS REFERENCES:
GO-113
GD-113
SPACE SHUTTLE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-110
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Shuttle
SYSTEM-SUB SYSTEM
Reactor, Shuttle
OPERATION
Shuttle Transport
MISSION PHASE/EVENT
On-Orbit Operations, End of Mission
TITLE: SPENT REACTOR DECAY HEAT REMOVAL AND RADIATION PROTECTION
STATEMENT . Provide for decay heat removal and radiation shielding if a spent reactor is
transferred to the Shuttle less than 10 days after shutdown.
JUSTIFICATION : The radiation field created by the fission products in a shutdown reactor is
rapidly reduced in strength during the first several days following shutdown. With no addi-
tional gamma shielding for the Shuttle crew, a minimum wait time (from reactor shutdown
to initiation of replacement/recovery operations) of approximately 10 days is required for
the dose rate (with the reactor/shield assembly positioned aft in the cargo bay) to decay be-
low the maximum allowable 150 mrem/day (reactor power history: 5 yrs at 125 kWt). The
fission product after heat generation in a reactor that has operated at 125 kWt for 5 yrs de-
cays to approximately 250 w after 10 days (500 w two days after shutdown). Therefore,
if the reactor is to be transferred to the Shuttle during the first 10 days after shutdown,
additional nuclear radiation shielding for the Shuttle crew must be provided and
an afterheat removal system may be required. HAZARDCATEGORY
REMARKS = Scattered (reflected) radiation from hardware located in the near vicinity of the
reactor can be a major contributor to the total radiation received by the Shuttle crew. If
radiation protection is required for the Shuttle crew, the mass of additional shielding de-
pends on the reactor fission product inventory and the location chosen for shield placement.
The radiation impact on Shuttle components is related to the integrated dose and hence is
mission dependent. Consideration.can be given to localized shielding for critical compo-
nents (i.e., solid state electronic devices, etc.), and hardening techniques can be applied
where required. Since, the afterheat generation is relatively low several days after shut-
down, it is possible that no special reactor/shield heat removal apparatus would be needed
since the heat capacity and natural heat loss from the Shuttle itself may be sufficient.
REFERENCES:
72SD4201-4-1 Section 3, Appendix B
CROSS REFERENCES:
GO-109, 134
SPACE SHUTTLE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-111
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Shuttle
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Reactor, Shuttle
OPERATION
Contingencies
MISSION PHASE/4vENT
Prelaunch, Launch/Ascent, On-Orbit Operations, End of Mission
TITLE: DETECTION OF NaK LEAK IN CARGO BAY
STATEMENT : Provide capability of detecting and alerting the Shuttle crew of a liquid metal
leak which would render the power module inoperable and provide potential hazards within
the Shuttle cargo bay.
JUSTIFICATION : During Shuttle transport of a reactor system, a NaK leak in a reactor coolam
loop could occur. If provisions are not made for detecting and alerting the Shuttle crew to
this situation, the mission could be curtailed and potential hazards to the crew, equipment,
the general public, and the ecology could result. If the NaK leak is detected and the Shuttle
crew alerted, contingency modes and emergency operating procedures can be implemented
which could eliminate or substantially reduce the adverse effects on the mission and the
risks to personnel.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS: Consider use of pressure measurements in the NaK coolant loops.
REFERENCES:
72SD4201-4-1 Section 6
CROSS REFERENCES:
GO-107
SPACE SHUTTLE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-112
PROGRAM EUEMENT
Shuttle
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Reactor, Shuttle
OPERATION
Contingencies
MISSION PHASE./fevENT
Launch/Ascent, End of Mission
TITLE: LIQUID METAL FIRE SUPPRESSION
STATEMENT : Consider provision of liquid metal fire suppression material within the
Shuttle.
JUSTIFICATION: Following an accident during the Launch/Ascent Phase of the mission (or at
the end of mission if the spent reactor is being returned to the earth's surface), an emer-
gency Shuttle landing may be attempted. A hard landing could rupture liquid metal compo-
nents and if environmental containment is not maintained, a liquid metal reaction could
result. Readily accessible quantities of liquid metal fire suppression material should be
provided in the Shuttle, as this material would probably not be available at an unplanned
landing site.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS: Fires are generally extinguished by the removal of oxygen. Extinguishing
materials normally used must not be applied to liquid metal fires because if the reaction
with common extinguishers such as water, carbon tetrachloride, carbon dioxide, and
sodium bicarbonate. The exclusion of oxygen can be effected by covering the burning metal
with such materials as dry alkali metal chlorides, graphite, or soda ash (calcium carbo-
nate). Met-L-X dry powder is an impregnated sodium chloride which is free flowing and
not susceptible to moisture pickup. Another commercial material is Pyrene G-l powder.
This is a graphite-base material. Yellow is the adopted color for liquid metal fire ex-
tinguishers and all equipment used for this purpose should be painted yellow for easy identi-
fication.
REFERENCES:
72SD4201-4-1 Section 6
CROSS REFERENCES:
SPACE SHUTTLE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-113
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Shuttle
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Reactor, Shuttle
OPERATION
Contingencies
MISSION PHASE
End of Mission (Return to Earth's Surface)
TITLE: REACTOR DISPOSAL/RECOVERY
STATEMENT : Consider a Shuttle return of only a reactor/shield by a design which permits
in-orbit separation of the radiator and other components.
JUSTIFICATION : Reactors that may be transported by the Space Shuttle use NaK as the heat
transfer medium to remove heat from Hie reactor core. Some systems also use NaK in the
heat rejection (radiator) loop. Because there is a possibility of a NaK leak and because
NaK reacts violently with oxygen, the less NaK that is present in the system, the better.
Therefore, if the reactor system has a NaK radiator, consideration should be given to pro-
viding a design which will allow separation of the reactor/shield assembly from the radiator
and other power conversion components. Such a design will allow the Shuttle to return only
the reactor/shield assembly rather than the entire power module. This will reduce the
potential for liquid metal fires and should facilitate ground handling procedures.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS: Separation of the reactor/shield assembly from the rest of the power module can
be accomplished by using a "separable heat exchanger". The separable heat exchanger
permits separation of the reactor, with the primary liquid metal coolant loop, from the
power conversion system and its secondary liquid metal coolant loop, without breaking any
liquid metal coolant lines.
In addition, if the selected means of reactor disposal is boost to high earth orbit, the
higher ballistic coefficient (W/Cr>A) of the reactor/shield configuration as compared to that
of the entire power module means considerably longer orbital lifetimes for a given disposal
altitude. This means that the fission products generated during operation aboard the Space
Base will have a longer time to decay to insignificant levels.
REFERENCES:
72SD4201-4-1 Section 3, 6; Appendix B
CROSS REFERENCES:
GD-109
GO-113
SPACE SHUTTLE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-114
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Shuttle
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
IRV, Small Isotope Sources,
Ground Support, Shuttle
OPERATION
Contingencies
MISSION PHASE^VENT
Prelaunch
TITLE: ON-PAD ISOTOPE COOLING
STATEMENT : Provide a rapid response back-up isotope cooling system at the launch pad
which does not require opening of the Shuttle doors.
JUSTIFICATION : Normal cooling of an isotope payload to at least 420°K (300°F) is required on
the launch pad to eliminate the isotope heat source as a potential Shuttle propellant vapor
ignition source. Loss of on-pad cooling of an isotope heat source contained within the
Shuttle cargo bay will result in an immediate rise in heat source temperature. If the
Shuttle doors are opened to allow the heat source to radiate directly to space, propellant
fumes could enter the cargo bay and ignite. To reduce the possibility of inadvertent pro-
pellant iginition, a rapid response back-up isotope cooling system should be provided at the
launch pad which does not require opening of the Shuttle cargo bay doors.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS: Cooling during prelaunch can be accomplished by pumping cold nitrogen or some
other cryogenic fluid over the heat source. Incorporating redundancy into this system
could provide the suggested emergency back-up. The cold nitrogen would be supplied by
existing Ground Support Equipment (GSE) located in the Mobile Launcher.
REFERENCES:
72SD4201-4-1 Sections 4, 5, 6; Appendix C
CROSS REFERENCES:
RD-101
GO-120
SPACE SHUTTLE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-115
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Shuttle
SYSTEM—SUBSYSTEM
IRV, Small Isotope Sources,
Shuttle
OPERATION
Shuttle Transport
MISSION PHASE/EVENT
Launch/As cent, On-Orbit Operations, End of Mission
TITLE: AUXILIARY POWER - ISOTOPE PAYLOAD
STATEMENT : Provide approximately 300 watts of electrical power (either from the Transfer
Module or the Shuttle).
JUSTIFICATION : One requirement of the large isotope-Brayton systems is that heat be re-
moved at all times. This is accomplished by direct radiation to space when possible, but
there are periods in the mission when a heat rejection loop must be employed. The loop
pump will require approximately 300 watts of power. Minor amounts of power are also
required for the isotope-Brayton system status monitoring instrumentation and the system
controls.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS: The total energy requirement should not exceed two or three kilowatt-hours,
power could be supplied by batteries mounted on the transfer module or by the Shuttle
electrical power and distribution system.
Thi£
REFERENCES:
72SD4201-4-1 Sections 4, 5; Appendix C
CROSS REFERENCES:
GD-107
SPACE SHUTTLE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-116
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Shuttle
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
IRV, Small Isotope Sources,
Shuttle
OPERATION
Pay load Monitoring
MISSION PHASE / VENT
Prelaunch, Launch/ As cent, On-Orbit Operations, End of Mission
TITLE; PAYLOAD STATUS MONITORING EQUIPMENT
STATEMENT : Provide multiple and independent system monitoring and control equipment
witfi instantaneous and recording outputs for all mission phases.
JUSTIFICATION : The thermal control system associated with isotope systems is the critical
system to be monitored because the heat generated by fuel decay must be dissipated without
developing excessive temperatures in the heat source or elsewhere in the Shuttle orbiter
cargo bay that could result in equipment damage. To prevent such occurrences, instrumen
tation must be provided to monitor both the payload and the auxiliary systems (such as
thermal control and electrical power) required to service the payload.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS: The number of sensors and controls will be a function of the types of thermal
control system that are employed and Ihe thermal control system selection is in turn
dependent upon the environmental shielding approach. For a 4n environmental shielding
approach and an active pumped loop, an estimated 62 data points (sensors) are required
for maintaining periodic and, in some cases, continuous system status of heat source
integrity, radiation levels, heat source and cargo bay temperatures, etc. In addition to
the monitoring equipment, an estimated 32 control devices are required to provide thermal
control regulation, handling, attachment, and deployment controls from the Shuttle.
REFERENCES:
72SD4201-4-1 Sections 4, 5
CROSS REFERENCES:
GO-122
SPACE SHUTTLE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
PATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-117
PROGRAM EUEMENT
Shuttle
SYSTEM-SUB SYSTEM
IRV, Small Isotope Sources,
Shuttle
OPERATION
Shuttle Transport
MISSION PHASE/EVENT
Prelaunch, Launch/Ascent, On-Orbit Operations, End of Mission
TITLE: SHUTTLE CREW - NUCLEAR PAYLOAD SEPARATION (ISOTOPE)
STATEMENT: Assure maximum allowable shuttle crew - nuclear payload separation distance.
(IRV should be placed with side-on view to crew locations.)
JUSTIFICATION -. The maximum allowable radiation dose rate to the Shuttle crew is 150 mrem
day per study groundrule. This requirement can be met by locating the nuclear payload as
far as possible from the astronauts. Maximum separation distance will reduce shielding
requirements in applications where shielding is necessary.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS : With the IRV presenting a side-on view (of the planar array heat source) to the
crew location, the radiation exposure will be reduced through self shielding by the fuel,
the capsules, and the heat source structure. If a crewman is required to be positioned side
on to the heat source, he could remain within about 2 m of its center for 3 hrs. or at about
5 m for nearly an entire day without exceeding the allowable dose.
REFERENCES:
72SD4201-4-1 Sections 4, 5; Appendix C
CROSS REFERENCES:
GO-121, 134
SPACE SHUTTLE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-118
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Shuttle
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
mv
OPERATION
Contingencies
MISSION PHASE
Launch/Ascent, End of Mission
TITLE: FLOTATION GEAR
STATEMENT
 : Consider provision of flotation gear for an isotope-Brayton heat source
(possibly time limited).
JUSTIFICATION ; Due to the relatively high monetary value of the isotope inventory in a large
heat source, recovery is generally the prime aim at end of mission. Therefore, recovery
provisions such as possible flotation gear are important safely design features in the event
of an abort during descent/reentry (or launch/ascent).
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS:
REFERENCES:
72SD4201-4-1 Section 6
CROSS REFERENCES:
SPACE SHUTTLE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-119
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Shuttle
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Reactor, IRV, Small Isotope
Sources, Ground Support
OPERATION
Ground Handling
MISSION PHASE/4vENT
Prelaunch, End of Mission (Return to Earth's Surface)
TITLE: PA YLOAD HANDLING
STATEMENT : Provide certified equipment to handle nuclear payloads
JUSTIFICATION : The specialized requirements and precautions that must be observed in con-
nection with handling nuclear payloads (such as thermal control, radiation protection,
environmental enclosures, etc.) indicate that certified equipment should be provided to
reduce the possibility of an accident involving the nuclear hardware.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS: The provision of ground support and handling equipment which minimizesand
simplifies handling of the nuclear hardware reduces the chances of damage and accident
potential during prelaunch. The "transfer module" integration scheme is well suited for
this type of application. It offers added ease in safely handling nuclear systems. For
example, a reactor power module can be mounted on the transfer module at the manufac-
turer's site and not be removed until the power module transfer operations are initiated in
orbit.
REFERENCES:
72SD4201-4-1 Sections 3, 4, 5
CROSS REFERENCES:
GO-123
SPACE SHUTTLE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-120
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Shuttle
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Reactor, IRV, Small Isotope
Sources. Ground Support, Shuttle
OPERATION
Contingencies
MISSION PHASE
Prelaunch
;4vENT
TITLE: ON-PAD NITROGEN PURGING OF CARGO BAY
STATEMENT.- Provide dry N£ purging capability of the Shuttle cargo bay while on the launch
pad.
JUSTIFICATION . Providing the capability to purge the cargo bay with dry N£ or inert gas will
(1) help prevent a potential liquid metal fire if a liquid metal leak from a reactor Nak
coolant loop is detected, and (2) will reduce the ignition potential if a loss of on-pad cooling
of an isotope payload occurs.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS: The dry nitrogen can be supplied by existing Ground Support Equipment (GSE)
located in the Mobile Launcher.
REFERENCES:
72SD4201-4-1 Sections 3, 4, 5, 6
L
CROSS REFERENCES:
GD-122
SPACE SHUTTLE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-121
PROGRAM EUEMENT
Shuttle
SYSTEM—SUBSYSTEM
Reactor, IRV, Small Isotope
Sources, Shuttle
OPERATION
Shuttle/Payload Integration
MISSION PHASE /EVENT
Prelaunch, Launch/Ascent, On-Orbit Operations, End of Mission
TITLE: TRANSFER MODULE INTEGRATION SCHEME
STATEMENT : Consider use of Transfer Module integration scheme to reduce and simplify
Shuttle interfaces and to improve safety in handling nuclear payloads.
JUSTIFICATION : Nuclear payloads have unique support requirements such as radiation shield-
ing, thermal control, blast and fragmentation shielding, instrumentation, and auxiliary
power. A Transfer Module can meet these requirements and, in addition, can afford a
safe means for handling the payload and mounting it in the Shuttle cargo bay.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS.- transfer module is simply a carriage-type of assembly in which the nuclear
payload is placed prior to being installed in the Shuttle orbiter. The entire nuclear pay-
load/transfer module assembly is placed in the Shuttle cargo bay. The key advantage in
using a transfer module is that it not only reduces the impact on the nuclear payload of
being transported by the Space Shuttle, but it reduces the impact on the Shuttle when trans-
porting a nuclear payload. When a transfer module is used, much of the necessary ancil-
liary equipment can be incorporated into the transfer module rather than being mounted to
the Shuttle directly. The capability of emergency payload ejection into a deep ocean area
could be provided by the transfer module. There are, however, disadvantages associated
with this concept. The weight of the transfer module must be included in the total payload
weight and the transfer module will occupy some of the allowable payload space.
REFERENCES:
72SD4201-4-1 Sections 3, 4, 5
CROSS REFERENCES:
GO-127
SPACE SHUTTLE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-122
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Shuttle I
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Reactor, IRV, Small Isotope
Sources. Shuttle
OPERATION
Shuttle Transport
MISSION PHASE /EVENT
Prelaunch, Launch/Ascent, End of Mission
TITLE: SHUTTLE ENVIRONMENTAL ENCLOSURE
STATEMENT: Prevent propellant boil-off and other undesirable gases from entering Shuttle
cargo bay with the doors closed by provision of an environmental enclosure.
JUSTIFICATION : Reactors that may be transported by the Space Shuttle use NaK as the heat
transfer medium to remove heat from the reactor core. Because NaK reacts violently with
oxygen, LC>2 propellant boil-off should be prevented from entering the cargo bay.
The isotope heat source in the IRV generates 52 kw of thermal power. During prelaunch,
the heat source is cooled to at least 420°K to preclude the ignition of substances such as
hydrazine fumes that may exist in the launch pad area. Undesirable fumes and vapors
should be kept from entering the cargo bay should a cooling malfunction occur.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS : Preventing propellant boil-off and other undesirable gases from entering the
cargo bay can be accomplished by providing a positive pressure inert gas cover blanket or
by sealing off the cargo bay from the rest of the Shuttle.
REFERENCES:
72SD4201-4-1 Sections 3, 4, 5
CROSS REFERENCES:
GD-101, 102, 120
GO-103
SPACE SHUTTLE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-123
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Shuttle
SYSTEM—SUBSYSTEM
Reactor, IRV, Small Isotope
Sources, Shuttle
OPERATION
Radiation Monitoring
MISSION PHASE /EVENT
Prelaunch, Launch/Ascent, On-Orbit Operations, End of Mission
TITLE*. RADIATION MONITORING EQUIPMENT
STATEMENT : Provide multiple and independent radiation monitoring equipment with instan-
taneous and recording outputs.
JUSTIFICATION : Nuclear radiation emanating from a reactor or isotope heat source being
transported in the cargo bay of the Shuttle can result in injury to the Shuttle crew. Existing
requirements call for a maximum of 150 mrem per day exposure. Radiation monitoring
equipment is required to determine the actual exposure of each crew member.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS : Provisions must be made within the Shuttle crew compartment for the recording
and/or display of approximately 6 radiation monitoring sensors to assess the radiation
environment within the cargo bay and the crew compartment.
REFERENCES:
72SD4201-4-1 Sections 3, 4; Appendices B, C
CROSS REFERENCES:
GO-125
SPACE SHUTTLE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-124
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Shuttle I
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Reactor, ERV, Small Isotope
Sources. Shuttle
OPERATION
C outing encies
MISSION PHASE/EVENT
Prelaunch, Launch/Ascent, On-Orbit Operations, End of Mission
TITLE: DETECTION OF NUCLEAR PAYLOAD FAILURES DURING TRANSPORT
STATEMENT : Provide capability of detecting and alerting the Shuttle crew of nuclear payload
failures which occur during transport.
JUSTIFICATION : Failures and/or hazardous conditions of nuclear payloads in the cargo bay
could result during the mission, ff provisions are not made for detecting and alerting the
Shuttle crew to these situations, the mission could be curtailed and potential hazards to the
crew, equipment, the general public, and the ecology could result. E failures and/or
hazardous conditions of the nuclear hardware are detected, contingency modes and emer-
gency operating procedures can be implemented which could eliminate or substantially
reduce the adverse effects on the mission and the risks to personnel.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS: System status monitoring and liquid metal leak detectors will provide a means of
detecting some failures in nuclear payloads prior to docking to the Space Base.
With isotope payloads, the thermal control system is the critical system to be monitored
because the heat generated by fuel decay must be dissipated without developing excessive
temperatures in the heat source or elsewhere in the cargo bay.
REFERENCES:
72SD4201-4-1 Section 6
CROSS REFERENCES:
GD-105, 111, 116
GO-107, 122
SPACE SHUTTLE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-125
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Shuttle
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Reactor, IRV, Small Isotope
Sources. Shuttle. Ground Support
OPERATION
Contingencies
MISSION PHASE
Prelaunch, Launch/Ascent
TITLE: DIRECTED EJECTION OF PAYLOAD
STATEMENT : Provide a. free, unobstructed, and directed ejection path for the payload in the
event of a Shuttle booster or orbiter explosion on the launch pad.
JUSTIFICATION : The severe blast overpressures resulting from an on-pad explosion of the
Shuttle fuel tankage are so high that it precludes the use of any material that will withstand
the blast loading. In all likelihood in the event of a Shuttle explosion on the launch pad, the
nuclear payload will be thrown or blasted out of the cargo bay by the resultant overpres- ,
sures. It is desirable to position the launch vehicle on the launch pad and design the pay-
load mounting devices such that the payload is provided with a free, unobstructed, and
directed ejection path.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS : if the nuclear payload is thrown or blasted out of the Shuttle cargo bay by a launch
pad Shuttle explosion, it then becomes a matter of protecting the nuclear payload from the
primary and secondary fragmentation following such an explosion. A Shuttle launch con-
figuration concept which positions the orbiter between the booster and the Mobile Launcher
(ML) is particularly undesirable due to the possibility of slamming the nuclear payload
against the ML tower in the event of a launch pad explosion.
REFERENCES:
72SD4201-4-1 Sections 3, 4, 5, 6
CROSS REFERENCES:
SPACE SHUTTLE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-126
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Shuttle
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Reactor, IRV, Small Isotope
Sources. Shuttle
OPERATION
Contingencies
MISSION PHASE/EVENT
Launch/Ascent, On-Orbit Operations, End of Mission
TITLE: INTACT REENTRY AND IMPACT CAPABILITY OF NUCLEAR PAYLOAD
STATEMENT: Provide intact reentry and impact capability. Consider use of crush-up
materials in Shuttle orbiter cargo bay to minimize damage upon Shuttle land impact.
JUSTIFICATION : xhe release of radioactive material can be minimized by maximizing the
intact Impact capability of the nuclear payload and/or by providing crush-up structure in
the Shuttle orbiter cargo bay.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS : Some type of honeycomb structure could be provided for in the Shuttle orbiter
cargo bay to take some of the impact forces that are generated if a Shuttle crash landing
occurs.
REFERENCES:
72SD4201-4-1 Sections 3, 4, 5, 6, 7
72SD4201-1-2 Section 4
CROSS REFERENCES:
SPACE SHUTTLE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-127
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Shuttle
SYSTEM—SUBSYSTEM
Reactor, IRV, Small Isotope
Sources. Shuttle
OPERATION
Contingencies
MISSION PHASE/EVENT
Launch/Ascent, On-Orbit Operations, End of Mission
TITLE: TRACKING AND RECOVERY DEVICES FOR NUCLEAR PAYLOAD
STATEMENT : Provide tracking and recovery devices on nuclear payloads.
JUSTIFICATION : In the event of an in-orbit accident, the nuclear payload may be jettisoned or
released from the Shuttle orbiter cargo bay. It is desirable to retrieve or recover the pay-
load as quickly and as safely as possibly to reduce the hazard that it represents. There-
fore, tracking and recovery devices on the nuclear payload should be provided to aid in
locating and rendezvousing with the payload.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS: Transponders, beacons, etc. can be considered. In addition, special grappling
devices on the nuclear payload may be desirable. Shuttle compatible receiving hard-
ware must be supplied.
REFERENCES:
72SD4201-4-1 Section 6
CROSS REFERENCES:
GO-114, 131
SPACE SHUTTLE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-128
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Shuttle I SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEMReactor, ERV, Small Isotope OPERATIONContingencies
MISSION PHASE
Prelaunch, Launch/Ascent, End of Mission
TITLE: SHUTTLE DECONTAMINATION
STATEMENT . Provide a. clesoi, smooth surface cargo bay to facilitate decontamination, and
minimize the time required.
JUSTIFICATION: Clean, smooth cargo bay surfaces, free from protrusions and crevices
would enhance decontamination procedures, thus reducing the possibility of a radiation
hazard or liquid metal fire.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS: 5 there are sections in the cargo bay which may be inaccessible to decontamina-
tion, equipment, such sections must be protected so that no liquid metal or radioactive
debris could get into them.
Decontamination should be performed in an environmentally controlled area, such as would
3e provided by the nuclear check-out facility or liquid metal servicing building.
/lean, unobstructed surfaces should be a design objective.
REFERENCES:
72SD4201^-1 Sections
CROSS REFERENCES:
GO-128
RO-106
SPACE SHUTTLE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-129
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Shuttle
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Facilities (Reactor)
OPERATION
Ground Handling, Storage
and Checkout
MISSION PHASE /EVENT
Prelaunch, End of Mission (Return to Earth's Surface)
TITLE: NUCLEAR FACILITIES (REACTOR)
STATEMENT : Provide certified facilities to:
• Store reactor power modules
• Checkout reactor power modules and components
• Perform radiological monitoring and control functions
JUSTIFICATION : The specialized requirements and precautions that must be observed in con-
nection with reactor power systems and components (such as radiation detection and protec-
tion, assuring NaK containment, etc.) indicate that a special facility must be provided.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS: Existing facilities at KSC such as the pyrotechnic facility could be used on a
temporary or near term basis where only relatively small amounts of nuclear hardware are
involved. However, with programs involving large amounts of nuclear hardware (i. e,,
several reactor power modules), new facilities should be provided because the cost of modi-
fying existing facilities may be greater than constructing new facilities. The only new
facilities that have been identified are (1) a nuclear system check-out building, and (2) a
liquid metal servicing building. Depending on the amounts of liquid metals involved, the
liquid metal servicing building may be small, and in fact, could possibly be a portioned
off section of the nuclear check-out building.
REFERENCES:
72SD4201-4-1 Sections
CROSS REFERENCES:
GO-101
SPACE SHUTTLE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GD-130
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Shuttle
SYSTEM—SUBSYSTEM
Facilities (Isotope)
OPERATION
Ground Handling, Storage,
and Checkout
MISSION PHASE /4vENT
Prelaunch, End of Mission
TITLE: NUCLEAR FACILITIES (ISOTOPE)
STATEMENT : Provide certified facilities to:
• Store isotope fuel capsules
• Load isotope fuel capsules into heat sources
• Install heat source in IRV
• Checkout isotope power systems and components
• Perform radiological monitoring and control functions
JUSTIFICATION : The specialized requirements and precautions that must be observed in con-
nection with isotope power systems, heat sources, and components (such as radiation
detection and protection, thermal control, etc.) indicate that a special facility must be
provided.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS: Existing facilities at KSC such as the pyrotechnic facility could be used on a
temporary or near term basis where only relatively small amounts of nuclear hardware are
involved. However, with programs involving large amounts of nuclear hardware (i. e.,
several isotope heat sources), new facilities should be provided because the cost of modi-
fying existing facilities may be greater than constructing a new facility. The only new
facility that has been identified for applications involving isotope systems is a nuclear sys-
tem check-out building.
REFERENCES:
72SD4201-4-1 Sections 4, 5; Appendix C
L
CROSS REFERENCES:
GO-116
SPACE SHUTTLE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GO-101
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Shuttle
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Reactor, Ground Support
OPERATION
Ground Handling, Storage,
and Checkout
MISSION PHASE/4vENT
Prelaunch, End of Mission (Return to Earth's Surface)
TITLE: NUCLEAR OPERATIONAL PLANS (REACTOR)
STATEMENT : Provide certified operational plans to:
• Store reactor power systems
• Check out reactor power systems and components
JUSTIFICATION : The specialized requirements and precautions that must be observed in con-
nection with reactor power systems and components (such as radiation detection and pro-
tection, assuring NaK containment, etc.), indicate that special operational plans must be
provided.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS:
REFERENCES:
72SD4201-4-1 Section 3, Appendix B
CROSS REFERENCES:
GD-129
SPACE SHUTTLE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GO-102
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Shuttle
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Reactor, Ground Support
OPERATION
Ground Handling
MISSION PHASE/EVENT
Prelaunch
TITLE: FIRE ALARM AND PROTECTION (REACTOR)
STATEMENT : Provide fire alarm and protection system training and procedures capable of
supporting hardware containing nuclear material and liquid metals in:
• Nuclear facility
• Transporter
• Launch pad
JUSTIFICATION : Fires involving the reactor system or its supporting equipment can present
serious nuclear hazards in addition to destroying expensive and hard to replace equipment.
Fire alarm and protection systems, and the proper training can reduce these possibilities.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS: To preclude the possibility of a NaK-oxygen reaction that could result in a cata-
strophic fire, an inert gas (Argon, Helium, or Nitrogen) environmental cover gas blanket
should be provided for all the reactor components that contain NaK.
As can be determined the fire protection provisions at KSC may not be adequate of support-
ing a. nuclear reactor system. In addition, known incompatibilities of presently used sub-
stances with liquid metals exist. The effective control and prompt extinguishment of liquid
metal fires at KSC can be accomplished through a program which includes special design
considerations as well as careful adherence to procedures, use of trained personnel, and
provision of proper equipment. In order to implement such a program, a thorough study is
recommended with emphasis on the VAB and launch pad.
REFERENCES:
72SD4201-i-l
72SD4201-4-2
Sections 3, 7
Section 4
L
CROSS REFERENCES:
SPACE SHUTTLE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GO-103
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Shuttle
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Reactor
OPERATION
Shuttle Transport
MISSION PHASE/EVENT
Prelaunch
TITLE: ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION OPERATIONS
STATEMENT : Provide operational procedures for maintaining an inert gas blanket and/or
double containment during the prelaunch period to preclude a NaK-oxygen reaction in the
event of NaK leak.
JUSTIFICATION : Reactors that may be transported by the Shuttle use NaK as the heat transfer
medium to remove heat from the reactor core. Some systems also use NaK in the heat
rejection (radiator) loop. Because there is a possibility of a NaK leak, and because NaK
reacts violently with oxygen, an inert gas blanket coupled with double wall containment mus
be provided to prevent the presence of moisture and other oxygen sources from coming in
contact with the NaK coolant.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS: An added safety precaution involves sealing off the cargo bay from the rest of the
Shuttle, especially from the LO2 and LH vapor boil-off of propellant tanks or fuel cell
storage bottles.
The requirements for an inert gas environmental enclosure are significantly increased of a
liquid metal NaK coolant is used in the primary heat rejection loop rather than an organic
coolant (i.e., Dow Corning 200).
REFERENCES:
72SD4201-1-1 Sections
CROSS REFERENCES:
GD-122
GO-104
SPACE SHUTTLE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GO-104
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Shuttle
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Reactor,. Shuttle, Ground
Support. Facilities
OPERATION
Contingencies
MISSION PHASE/EVENT
Prelaunch, End of Mission (Return to Earth's Surface)
TITLE: LIQUID METAL SAFING CAPABILITY
STATEMENT : Provide a. controlled environment liquid metal safing capability at launch
and landing sites (reduction of O sources).
JUSTIFICATION : Reactors that may be transported by the Space Shuttle use NaK as a coolant.
Because there is a possibility of a NaK leak and because NaK reacts violently in the
presence if oxygen, the proper equipment and techniques to safe the system and reduce
the liquid metal hazards should be provided.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS: A positive pressure liner could be placed around the reactor/shield assembly
or the entire power module prior to or during installation in the cargo bay. This liner
could be designed to contain the NaK leak and also maintain a positive inert gas pressure
until the power module is within the controlled environment of the liquid metal servicing
facility.
A complete liquid metal servicing facility capable of liquid metal charging and purification
may not be necessary, but should be a definite consideration if extensive nuclear activities
or several programs are to be supported.
REFERENCES:
72SD4201-4-1 Section 3,6
CROSS REFERENCES:
GD-102
GO-103,105
SPACE SHUTTLE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GO-105
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Shuttle
SYSTEM—SUBSYSTEM
Reactor, Ground Support
OPERATION
Ground Handling
MISSION PHASE
End of Mission (Return to Earth's Surface)
TITLE: PAYLOAD REMOVAL (REACTOR)
STATEMENT: Provide certified unloading, decontamination and liquid metal equipment and
procedures to handle nuclear reactor power modules subsequent to Shuttle landing.
JUSTIFICATION : rpne equipment and procedures employed to remove the nuclear reactor
payload from the Shuttle after its landing must be capable of:
• Monitoring for radioactivity
• Decontaminating the cargo bay if necessary
• Removing, if necessary, heat generated by the reactor payload
• Maintaining suitably low levels of radioactivity at stations occupied by ground
and flight personnel
« Protecting the radioactive payload from fire and other potentially dangerous
environments.
• Removing or rendering inactive the liquid metals carried by the
reactor power module.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS: -phe removal of the reactor payload from the Shuttle cargo bay should be
performed in a controlled environment. This could be afforded by a nuclear checkout
facility and/or a liquid metal servicing building located at the landing site.
REFERENCES:
72SD4201-4-1 Section 3
CROSS REFERENCES:
GO-104
GD-102
SPACE SHUTTLE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GO-106
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Shuttle
SYSTEM—SUBSYSTEM
Reactor
OPERATION
In-Qrbit Handling and
Transfer
MISSION PHASE
On-Orbit Operations
TITLE: NaK LOOP INTEGRITY DURING ORBITAL OPERATIONS
STATEMENT : Provide installation, retrieval, and maintenance procedures that do not
require breaking or opening of NaK loops.
JUSTIFICATION : NaK, used as the primary coolant in most reactor systems, reacts violently
in the presence of oxygen (which may be leaking or otherwise being discharged from the
Space Base or Space Shuttle) and is very corrosive. If NaK is released in orbit, it may
vaporize and then condense on external surfaces and the vapor could contaminate the sur-
rounding environment. Therefore, installation and maintenance procedures must not
involve the opening or breaking of NaK loops.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS: If NaK loops are broken, an EVA will most likely be required if repair is to be
attempted. Since NaK is probably not compatible with the space suits worn by the astro-
nauts, EVA may be hazardous.
REFERENCES:
72SD4201-4-1 Section 3, Appendix B
CROSS REFERENCES:
GD-106
SPACE SHUTTLE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GO-107
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Shuttle
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Reactor, Shuttle
OPERATION
Payload Monitoring
MISSION PHASE /EVENT
Prelaunch, Launch/Ascent, On-Orbit Operations, End of Mission
TITLE: PAYLOAD STATUS MONITORING PROCEDURES
STATEMENT : Provide Shuttle crew training with confirmed procedures in the use of
multiple and independent system monitoring equipment with instantaneous and recorded
outputs for all mission phases.
JUSTIFICATION : Knowing the condition of the reactor power module within the Shuttle orbiter
cargo bay permits an assessment by the crew of the "go/no-go" status of the payload
(1) prior to launch, (2) prior to final rendezvous and docking, and (3) prior to initiating the
reentry, final approach and landing upon returning a spent reactor power module to the
earth's surface. A detected failure condition, such as a liquid metal or radiator coolant
leak, would eliminate the need for docking and the subsequent removal(from the cargo bay)
of a damaged power module. A detected failure condition of the power module which is
deemed a hazard upon landing could result in the emergency ejection of the power module
into a deep ocean area prior to earth landing.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS: Provisions must be made for the recording and/or display of a maximum of
80 data points (sensors) for maintaining periodic and, in some cases, continuous system
status of power module integrity, radiation levels, NaK leaks, power module and cargo bay
temperatures, etc. In addition to the monitoring equipment, some 20 separate control
signals are required to provide environmental control regulation, handling, attachment
and deployment controls from the Shuttle.
REFERENCES:
72SD4201-4-1 Section 3
CROSS REFERENCES:
GD-105
SPACE SHUTTLE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GO-108
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Shuttle
SYSTEM- SUBSYSTEM
Reactor, Shuttle
OPERATION
In-Orbit Cargo Transfer
MISSION PHASE /EVENT
On-Orbit Operations
TITLE: USE OF SHADOW SHIELDING DURING TRANSFER OPERATIONS
STATEMENT . Provide rendezvous and docking positions such that the Shuttle crew locations
are within the shadow of the reactor shield to minimize the dose to the crew during docking
and replacement operations.
JUSTIFICATION: Radiation exposure guidelines specify crew exposure limits of 150 mrem/
day. Reactor docking and replacement procedures involving movement of the spent reactor
such that the Shuttle crew remains within the shadow of the reactor shield will assist in
meeting the 150 mrem/day limitation.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS: in examining the NAR and MDAC Shuttle orbiters and their selected cargo trans-
fer mechanisms (manipulator arms and 90° rotation, respectively) it was found that the
crew locations in the MDAC Shuttle may be outside the shadow of the reactor shield (depend-
ing on the reactor power module configuration) during the docking and replacement opera-
tions. The crew may therefore receive some amounts of direct radiation.
Orienting the spent reactor in a fashion that shadow shields the Shuttle crew may expose
the Space Base crew to direct radiation. A compromise may be necessary.
REFERENCES:
72SD42 01-4-1 Section 3, Appendix B
CROSS REFERENCES:
GO-134,135
SPACE SHUTTLE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GO-109
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Shuttle
SYSTEM—SUBSYSTEM
Reactor
OPERATION
Shuttle Transport
MISSION PHASE /EVENT
On-Orbit Operations
TITLE: SPENT REACTOR HANDLING
STATEMENT : Consider allowing at least 10 days after shutdown before enacting Shuttle
transfer operations with a spent reactor. If this procedure is not possible, provide for
decay heat removal and radiation shielding if the spent reactor is to be transferred to the
Shuttle less than 10 days after shutdown.
JUSTIFICATION ; The radiation field created by the fission products in a shutdown reactor is
rapidly reduced in strength during the first several days following shutdown. With no
additional gamma shielding for the Shuttle crew, a minimum wait time (from reactor shut-
down to initiation of replacement/recovery operations) of approximately 10 days is re-
quired for the dose rate (with the reactor shield assembly positioned aft in the cargo bay)
to decay below the maximum allowable 150 mrem/day (reactor power history: 5 yrs at
125 kWt). The fission product afterheat generation in a reactor that has operated at
125 kWt for 5 yrs decays to approximately 250 W after 10 days (500 W two days after
shutdown). Therefore, if the reactor is to be transferred to the Shuttle during the
first 10 days after shutdown, additional nuclear radiation shielding for the Shut-
tle crew must be provided and an afterheat removal system may be required.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS: Scattered (reflected) radiation from hardware located in the near vicinity of the
reactor can be a major contributer to the total radiation received by the Shuttle crew. If
radiation protection is required for the Shuttle crew, the mass of additional shielding de-
pends on the reactor fission product inventory and the location chosen for shield placement.
The radiation impact on Shuttle components is related to the integrated dose and hence is
mission dependent. Consideration can be given to localized shielding for critical compo-
nents (i. e., solid state electronic devices, etc.), and hardening techniques can be applied
where required. Since, the afterheat generation is relatively low several days after shut-
down, it is possible that no special reactor/shield heat removal apparatus would be needed
since the heat capacity and natural heat loss from the Shuttle itself may be sufficient.
REFERENCES:
72SD42 01-4-1 Section 3, Appendix B
CROSS REFERENCES:
GD-110, 135
SPACE SHUTTLE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GO-110
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Shuttle
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Reactor/ Shuttle
OPERATION
EOM Disposal/Recovery
MISSION PHASE^VENT
End of Mission
TITLE: DISPOSAL/RECOVERY OPERATIONS (REACTOR)
STATEMENT : provide certified operational plans to dispose of or recover a spent
reactor power module.
JUSTIFICATION : Because of the potentially large and hazardous fission product inventory
present in the reactor core at the end of operation, certified operational plans are necesr-
sary for the safe disposal of the spent reactor power module.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS: xhe ih-orbit transfer operations involved with the disposal or recovery of a
spent reactor power module should be performed within the following constraints:
• No EVA is required in normal operations
• All hardware is secured at all times. No objects are permitted to "float" free
in space, nor is a simple tether an acceptable restraint.
• Transfer operations are performed by crew members of the Space Shuttle and/or
Space Base who are able to observe the transfer directly.
REFERENCES:
72SD4201-4-1 Section 3, Appendix B
L
CROSS REFERENCES:
GO-111,112,113,114,115
SPACE SHUTTLE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GO-111
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Shuttle
SYSTEM—SUBSYSTEM
Reactor, Shuttle
OPERATION
Reactor Disposal
(Boost to High Earth Orbit)
MISSION PHASE/EVENT
End of Mission
TITLE: REACTOR DISPOSAL ALTITUDE
STATEMENT
 : Provide Si minimum 100 year orbital lifetime for a spent reactor in high
earth orbit (250 year orbit is preferred to give 9 half-life decay).
JUSTIFICATION : Disposal of the spent reactor power module in a high earth orbit with an
orbital lifetime of at least 100 years will give the majority of the core fission products
adequate time to decay to insignificant, non-hazardous radiation levels. However, since it
is generally accepted that an orbital decay time of approximately ten half lives of the long-
est fission product is preferable from a nuclear safety standpoint, a 250 year orbital decay
time is preferred.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS: The reference Space Shuttle has the capability to boost a reactor payload to a
maximum circular disposal altitude of 835 km (450 n mi) resulting in an estimated 250 year
orbital lifetime. This represents approximately 10 half lives of the dominant long-lived
core fission products (CS-137 and Sr-90 with half-lives of 30 yrs and 28 yrs, respectively).
REFERENCES;
72SD42 01-4-1 Section 3, 7
CROSS REFERENCES:
SPACE SHUTTLE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GO112
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Shuttle
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Reactor, Shuttle
OPERATION
Contingencies
MISSION PHASE ,
End of Mission (Boost to High Earth Orbit)
TITLE: REACTOR DISPOSAL SYSTEM INSTALLATION BY SHUTTLE
STATEMENT : Consider capability to install a replaceable or strap-on reactor disposal
system by the Shuttle crew.
JUSTIFICATION : r^ gpace shuttle may be required to dispose of or recover a previously
damaged power module. The action taken is dependent on the extent of the damage. It is
therefore important that the damage be known prior to commitment of the Shuttle so that
the proper action can be taken. If damage is of such an extent that considerable hazards
would be presented to the Shuttle and crew or placement within the cargo bay would be im-
possible, it would be advisable to enact a separate (apart from the Shuttle) disposal to high
earth orbit. If a disposal system were not part of the power module or the existing dis-
posal system were inoperable, the Shuttle could be called upon to bring up a replaceable or
strap-on disposal package.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS: Time spent in these operations should be minimized as the damaged power
module would possibly remain attached to the Space Base, necessitating a reduction in
Space Base power.
Precaution should be taken during this contingency operation to not exceed the Shuttle crew
maximum allowable dose rate from the nuclear payload of 150 mrem/day.
REFERENCES:
72SD42 01-4-1 Section 6
.
CROSS REFERENCES:
SPACE SHUTTLE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
;DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GO-113
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Shuttle
SYSTEM-SUB SYSTEM
Reactor
OPERATION
Reactor Disposal (Boost to
High Earth Orbit)
MISSION PHASE/EVENT
End of Mission
TITLE: SEPARATION OF R/S ASSEMBLY FROM PCS
STATEMENT: Consider capability of reactor/shield separation from the radiator at end of
mission (disposal or recovery).
JUSTIFICATION -. if fa& selected reactor disposal scheme is the placement of the spent
reactor in high earth orbit, its orbital lifetime at a given altitude will increase consider-
ably as its ballistic coefficient ( W. ) increases,, The ballistic coefficient can be sub-
stantially increased by separating" the radiator from the reactor/shield assembly and
boosting only the latter to high earth orbit. This provision eliminates the transport of the
radiator back to the earth via the Shuttle.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS: Separation of the reactor/shield assembly from the rest of the power module can
be accomplished by using a "separable heat exchanger". The separable heat exchanger
permits separation of the reactor, with the primary liquid metal coolant loop, from the
power conversion system and its secondary liquid metal coolant loop, without breaking any
liquid metal coolant lines.
REFERENCES:
72SD4201-4-1 Section 3, Appendix B
CROSS REFERENCES:
GD-109,113
SPACE SHUTTLE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GO-114
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Shuttle
SYSTEM—SUBSYSTEM
Reactor, Ground Support
OPERATION
Reactor Disposal (Boost to
Earth Orbit)
MISSION PHASE /EVENT
End of Mission
TITLE: TRACKING OF SPENT REACTOR POWER MODULE
STATEMENT
 : Consider means of long term tracking of reactor power module following
boost to a high earth disposal orbit (for possible recovery at a later date).
JUSTIFICATION : After the reactor has completed its operational lifetime (or in the event of
a non-reparable system failure) it is necessary to dispose of the spent reactor power
module in a way that will not present a nuclear hazard to the earth's populace and ecology.
This can be accomplished by using the Space Shuttle to transport the power module to a high
earth disposal orbit, thereby increasing the orbital lifetime of the power module, giving
the core fission products adequate time to decay to insignificant, non-hazardous radiation
levels. However, if no permanent reactor shutdown mechanism has been employed, the
reactor may still be able to undergo a destructive excursion upon random reentry by
orbital decay and earth impact. To reduce the risks to the general public of such an event,
long term tracking of the spent reactor power module should be considered for
possible Shuttle recovery and re-boost at a later date or return to the earth's
surface.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS: Analysis indicates that "perfectly reliable" Shuttle re-boosts of a spent reactor
power module to high earth disposal orbits rather than allowing random reentry following
orbital decay from the initial high earth disposal orbit (orbital lifetime = 250 yrs) can re-
duce the risk to the general populace by approximately three orders of magnitude.
A beacon employed on the reactor power module would enhance tracking by ground and
space radar. Reliability of such a device under the thermal, radiation, and long life en-
vironment needs to be evaluated.
REFERENCES:
72SD4201-4-1 Section 3, 7
72SD42 01-4-2 Section 2
CROSS REFERENCES:
GD-127
GO-115
SPACE SHUTTLE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GO-115
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Shuttle
SYSTEM—SUBSYSTEM
Reactor, Shuttle
OPERATION
Contingencies
MISSION PHASE/feVENT
End of Mission (Boost to High Earth Orbit)
TITLE: REACTOR DISPOSAL TO HIGH EARTH ORBIT
STATEMENT : Consider reactor reboost capability to a new long-life orbit by
the Shuttle.
JUSTIFICATION : AS long as it may be possible for a destructive excursion to occur on
earth impact of a reactor, random reentry from earth orbit is not acceptable from a
nuclear safely standpoint. Therefore, if a spent reactor power module is boosted to a
long-life high earth for disposal, consideration should be given to providing reactor
reboost capability (at a later date) to a new long-life high altitude disposal orbit.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS: Analysis indicates that "perfectly reliable" Shuttle reboosts of a spent
reactor power module to new long-life disposal orbits rather than allowing random reentry
following orbital decay from the initial high earth disposal orbit (orbital lifetime = 250 yrs)
can reduce the risk to the general populace by approximately three orders of magnitude.
REFERENCES:
72SD42 01-4-1
72SD42 01-4-2
Sections, 6,7
Section 2
CROSS REFERENCES:
r~
GO-114
SPACE SHUTTLE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GO-116
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Shuttle
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
IRV, Small Isotope Sources,
Ground Support
OPERATION
Ground Handling, Storage,
and Checkout
MISSION PHASE/EVENT
Prelaunch, End of Mission
TITLE: NUCLEAR OPERATIONAL PLANS (ISOTOPE)
STATEMENT : provi(je certified operational plans to:
• Receive and store isotope fuel capsules
• Load isotope fuel capsules into heat source
• Install heat source in IRV
• Check out isotope power systems and components
JUSTIFICATION : The specialized requirements and precautions that must be observed in
connection with isotope power systems, heat sources, and components (such as radiation
detection and protection, thermal control, etc.), indicate that special operational plans
must be provided.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS:
REFERENCES:
72SD4201-4-1 Sections 4, 5; Appendix C
CROSS REFERENCES:
GI>-130
SPACE SHUTTLE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GO-117
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Shuttle
SYSTEM—SUBSYSTEM OPERATION
IRV, Small Isotope Sources,
Ground Support Ground Handling
MISSION PHASE/VENT
Prelaunch
TITLE: FIRE ALARM AND PROTECTION (ISOTOPE)
STATEMENT: Provide fire alarm and protection system training and procedures capable
of supporting isotope hardware at:
• Nuclear facility
• Transporter
• Launch pad
JUSTIFICATION : Fires involving an isotope system or its supporting equipment can present
serious nuclear hazards in addition to destroying expensive and hard to replace equipment.
Firm alarm and protection systems, and the proper training can reduce these possibilities,
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS: The isotope heat source should be cooled to 420°K (300°F) to keep the heat source
temperature below the ignition point of any propellant fumes which may be in the launch
pad area.
REFERENCES:
72SD420i^-4-l Sections 4, 5, 7
72SD4201-4-2 Section 4
CROSS REFERENCES:
SPACE SHUTTLE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GO-118
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Shuttle
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
IRV, Small Isotope Sources,
Ground Support
OPERATION
Emergency Retrieval
MISSION PHASE/EVENT
Prelaunch, Launch/Ascent, End of Mission
TITLE: QUICK RETRIEVAL OPERATIONS INVOLVING ISOTOPE PAYLOADS
STATEMENT : Provide quick retrieval operations to remove nuclear payload during an
emergency.
JUSTIFICATION: Nuclear payloads, particularly isotope heat sources, present a potential
nuclear safety hazard when they are in me Shuttle cargo bay during the prelaunch period
(or subsequent to landing). This hazard can be reduced if equipment is available to quickly
remove the nuclear payload from the Shuttle cargo bay in the event of an emergency, such
as a fire at the pad or upon landing.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS:
REFERENCES:
72SD4201-4-1 Sections 4, 5,6; Appendix C
CROSS REFERENCES:
SPACE SHUTTLE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GO-119
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Shuttle
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
IRV, Small Isotope Sources,
Ground Support
OPERATION
Installation
MISSION PHASE/EVENT
Prelaunch
TITLE: ISOTOPE HEAT SOURCE INSTALLATION IN SHUTTLE
STATEMENT.- install the isotope heat source in the Shuttle cargo bay at the last practicable
point in the launch countdown sequence.
JUSTIFICATION : -me isotope heat source in the IRV generates 52kW of thermal power and
produces a radiation field of approximately 600 mrem/hr at a distance of one meter. Be-
cause of these considerations plus the fact that the heat source temperature must be main-
tained at 420 K (to preclude the ignition of substances such as hydrazine fumes that may
exist in the launch pad area), integration with the Shuttle on the launch pad should occur
as late in the countdown as possible.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS: A minimum amount of functional tests need be performed on the isotope system
while on the launch vehicle. Compatibility tests prior to installation on the launch vehicle
could for the most part be performed with a payload simulator.
REFERENCES:
72SD4201-4-1 Sections 4, 5; Appendix C
L
CROSS REFERENCES:
RD-101
SPACE SHUTTLE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GO-120
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Shuttle I
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
IRV, Small Isotope Sources,
Shuttle
OPERATION
Countdown and Contingencies
MISSION PHASE/4vENT
Prelaunch
TITLE: IGNITION POTENTIAL ON LAUNCH PAD
STATEMENT : capability to reduce ignitable propellant fumes around the cargo bay
(i. e. , drainage of propellant tanks and/or purging immediate payload area).
JUSTIFICATION : Normal cooling of the heat source to at least 420°K is required to eliminate
the isotope heat source as a potential Shuttle propellant vapor ignition source. Loss of on-
pad cooling of an isotope heat source contained within the Shuttle cargo bay will result in
an immediate rise in heat source temperature. The potential for oxidation of the heat
source refractory metals increases as the temperature rises. A maximum design temper-
ature of approximately 700°K in ambient conditions is suggested. A heat source cooling
system failure with Shuttle doors closed would result in a heat source temperature rise to
550°K within a half-hour and 700°K in approximately one hour. Repair of the prime cooling
system on the Mobile Launcher or start-up of an auxiliary back-up cooling system should be
accomplished within this time frame. Failure to do so would require opening of
the cargo bay doors to permit use of external cooling systems and prevent dam-
age to the Shuttle. Draining of the propellant tanks and/or purging of the cargo
bay area with dry N2 may be advisable in this event to reduce the ignition po-
tential that exists on the launch pad.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS:
REFERENCES:
72SD4201-4-1 Section 6
CROSS REFERENCES:
GD-114
GO-119
RD-101
SPACE SHUTTLE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GO-121
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Shuttle
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
IRV
OPERATION
Shuttle Transport
MISSION PHASE /EVENT
Prelaunch, Launch/Ascent, On-Orbit Operations, End of Mission
TITLE: CREW OPERATIONS IN VICINITY OF IRV
STATEMENT : Avoid or limit operations of the crew which place them in the near vicinity of
the heat source and in particular those positions perpendicular to the radiating surface.
JUSTIFICATION: The maximum allowable radiation dose rate to the Shuttle crew is 150 mrenV
day per study groundrule. If a crewman is required to be positioned side-on to the heat
source, he could remain within about 2m of its center for 3 hours or at about 5m for nearly
an entire day without exceeding the allowable dose. Dose rates along the planes perpen-
dicular to the radiating face of the heat source are somewhat higher. Such an orientation
of the heat source with respect to the Shuttle crew should be avoided, or if necessary,
limited to only brief periods during transfer operations.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS: With the IRV presenting a side-on view (of the planar array heat source) to the
crew location, the radiation exposure will be reduced through self shielding by the fuel,
the capsules, and the heat source structure.
REFERENCES:
72SD4201-4-1 Section 4, Appendix C
CROSS REFERENCES:
GD-117
SPACE SHUTTLE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GO-122
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Shuttle
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
IRV, Small Isotope Sources,
Shuttle
OPERATION
Payload Monitoring
MISSION PHASE/EVENT
Prelaunch, Launch/Ascent, On-Orbit Operations, End of Mission
TITLE: PAYLOAD STATUS MONITORING PROCEDURES
STATEMENT: Provide Shuttle crew training with confirmed procedures in the use of multiple
and independent system monitoring equipment with instantaneous and recorded outputs for
all mission phases.
JUSTIFICATION : The thermal control system associated with isotope systems is the critical
system to be monitored because the heat generated by fuel decay must be dissipated without
developing excessive temperatures in the heat source or elsewhere in the Shuttle orbiter
cargo bay that could result in equipment damage. To prevent such occurrences, instru-
mentation must be provided to monitor both the payload and the auxiliary systems (such as
thermal control and electrical power) required to service the payload.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS: The number of sensors and controls will be a function of the types of thermal
control systems that are employed and the thermal control system selection is in turn de-
pendent upon the environmental shielding approach. For a 4ir environmental shielding ap-
proach and an active pumped loop, an estimated 62 data points (sensors) are required for
maintaining periodic and, in some cases, continuous system status of heat source integrity,
radiation levels, heat source and cargo bay temperatures, etc. In addition to the monitor-
ing equipment, an estimated 32 control devices are required to provide thermal control
regulation, handling, attachment, and deployment controls from the Shuttle.
REFERENCES:
72SD4201-4-1 Section 4, 5
CROSS REFERENCES:
GD-116
SPACE SHUTTLE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GO-123
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Shuttle
SYSTEM—SUBSYSTEM
IRV, Small Isotope Sources,
Ground Support
OPERATION
Ground Handling
MISSION PHASE/EVENT
End of Mission
TITLE: PAYLOAD REMOVAL (ISOTOPE)
STATEMENT .- Provide certified removal equipment and procedures to handle the nuclear
payload subsequent to Shuttle landing.
JUSTIFICATION : .j^ g equipment and procedures employed to remove the isotope payload from
the Shuttle after its landing must be capable of:
• Monitoring for radioactivity
• Decontaminating the cargo bay if necessary
• Removing, if necessary, the heat generated by the isotope payload
• Maintaining suitably low levels of radioactivity at stations occupied by ground and
flight personnel.
o Protecting the radioactive payload from fire and other potentially dangerous
environments.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS: removal of the isotope payload from the Shuttle cargo,bay should be performed
in a controlled environment. This could be afforded by a nuclear check-out facility located
at the landing site.
REFERENCES:
72SD4201-4-1 Sections 4, 5
CROSS REFERENCES:
GD-119
SPACE SHUTTLE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GO-124
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Shuttle I SYSTEM—SUBSYSTEMIRV, Small Isotope Sources,Shuttle OPERATIONEOM Retrieval/Recovery
MISSION PHASE/EVENT
End of Mission
TITLE: RETRIEVAL/RECOVERY OPERATIONS (ISOTOPE)
STATEMENT .- Provide certified operational plans to retrieve and recover IRV and/or small
isotope sources.
JUSTIFICATION : Because of the relatively small quantities of the plutonium fuel available,
its high cost, and the potentially adverse radiological consequences if a fuel release would
occur, certified operational plans to retrieve and recover isotope payloads are necessary.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS: -j^g in_oroit transfer operations mvolved with the retrieval and recovery of nuclear
payloads should be performed within the following constraints:
• No EVA is required in normal operations
• All hardware is secured at all times. No objects are permitted to "float" free in
space, nor is a simple tether an acceptable restraint.
• Transfer operations are performed by crew members of the Space Shuttle and/or
Space Base who are able to observe the transfer directly.
REFERENCES:
72SD4201-4-1 Sections 4, 5; Appendix C
L
CROSS REFERENCES:
RO-106
SPACE SHUTTLE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GO-125
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Shuttle
SYSTEM—SUBSYSTEM
Reactor, IRV, Small Isotope
Sources, Shuttle i
OPERATION
Radiation Monitoring
MISSION PHASE/EVENT
Prelaunch, Launch/Ascent, On-Orbit Operations, End of Mission
TITLE: RADIATION MONITORING PROCEDURES
STATEMENT : Provide support personnel and Shuttle crew training with confirmed procedures
in the use of multiple and independent radiation monitoring equipment with instantaneous
and recorded outputs.
JUSTIFICATION: Nuclear radiation emanating from a reactor or isotope heat source being
transported in the cargo bay of the Shuttle can result in injury to the Shuttle crew. Exist-
ing requirements call for a maximum of 150 mrem per day exposure. Radiation monitoring
equipment is required to determine the actual exposure of each crew member.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS: Provisions must be made within the Shuttle crew compartment for the recording
and/or display of approximately 6 radiation monitoring sensors to assess the radiation en-
vironment within the cargo bay and the crew compartment.
REFERENCES:
72SD4201-1-1 Sections 3, 4; Appendices B, C
CROSS REFERENCES:
GD-123
SPACE SHUTTLE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GO-126
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Shuttle
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Reactor, IRV, Small Isotope
Sources, Ground Support
OPERATION
Emergency Recovery
MISSION PHASE/EVENT
Prelaunch
TITLE: RECOVERY GEAR AND PROCEDURES
STATEMENT : Provide recovery gear and procedures for use subsequent to prelaunch acci-
dents.
JUSTIFICATION: Prelaunch accidents such as the explosion of the Shuttle orbiter fuel tankage
could leave the nuclear payload damaged and in an unsafe condition. It can also result in
the payload being ejected some distance from the launch pad. The payload could be buried
in debris or submerged in water. It is necessary to identify all possible payloads condi-
tions subsequent to prelaunch accidents, and to provide the necessary equipment for re-
covery of the payload.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS:
REFERENCES:
72SD4201-4-1 Sections 3, 4, 5, 7; Appendices B, C
CROSS REFERENCES:
SPACE SHUTTLE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GO-127
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Shuttle
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Reactor, IRV, Small Isotope
Sources, Shuttle
OPERATION
Shuttle/Payload Integration
MISSION PHASE /EVENT
Prelaunch, Launch/Ascent, On-Orbit Operations, End of Mission
TITLES TRANSFER MODULE OPERATIONS
STATEMENT : Provide operations in the use of Transfer Modules to protect and reduce
handling and packaging requirements of nuclear payloads.
JUSTIFICATION: Nuclear payloads have unique support requirements such as environmental
protection, radiation shielding, thermal control, blast and fragmentation shielding, instru-
mentation, and auxiliary power. A Transfer Module can meet these requirements and, in
addition, can afford a safe means for handling the payload and mounting it in the Shuttle
cargo bay.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS: transfer module is simply a carriage-type of assembly in which the nuclear
payload is placed prior to being installed in the Shuttle orbiter. The entire nuclear payload/
transfer module assembly is placed in the Shuttle cargo bay. The key advantage in using a
transfer module is that it not only reduces the impact on the nuclear payload of being trans
ported by the Space Shuttle, but it reduces the impact on the Shuttle when transporting a
nuclear payload. When a transfer module is used, much of the necessary auxilliary equip-
ment can be incorporated into the transfer module rather than being mounted to the Shuttle
directly. The capability of emergency payload ejection into a deep ocean area could be
provided by the transfer module. There are, however, disadvantages associated with this
concept. The weight of the transfer module must be included in the total payload weight anc
the transfer module will occupy some of the allowable payload space.
REFERENCES:
72SD4201-4-1 Sections 3, 4, 5
L
CROSS REFERENCES:
GD-121 .
SPACE SHUTTLE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GO-128
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Shuttle
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM Reactor,
Small Isotope Sources, Ground
Support, Shuttle
OPERATION
Contingencies
MISSION PHASE /fevENT
Prelaunch, Launch/Ascent, End of Mission
TITLE: SHUTTLE DECONTAMINATION
STATEMENT : Provide Shuttle radiation and liquid metal decontamination capability at the
launch and landing sites.
JUSTIFICATION : To reduce the nuclear hazards involved with transporting a damaged or
faulty nuclear payload, provisions should be made for Shuttle radiation and liquid metal
decontamination capability at the launch/landing site.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS: Decontamination should be performed in an environmentally controlled area, such
as would be provided by the nuclear check-out facility or liquid metal servicing building.
Clean, smooth cargo bay surfaces, free from protrusions and crevices would enhance
decontamination procedures. A sealed crew compartment (separate ECLS) should be a de-
sign objective to assure radioactive vapor from fractured fuel capsules/fuel elements does
not enter the compartment.
REFERENCES:
72SD4201-4-1 Section 6
L
CROSS REFERENCES:
GD-128
SPACE SHUTTLE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GO-129
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Shuttle
SYSTEM—SUBSYSTEM
Reactor, IRV, Small Isotope
Sources, Shuttle
OPERATION
Contingencies
MISSION PHASE/EVENT
Launch/Ascent, End of Mission
TITLE: PAYLOAD EJECTION
STATEMENT: Provide emergency capability and procedures for ejection of the payload over
deep ocean areas (or continental shelf) or possible ditching of the Shuttle.
JUSTIFICATION : Should a known malfunction of the Space Shuttle increase the risk of a crash
on landing (at end of mission recovery or from a mission abort during ascent), emergency
ejection of the payload at sea or ditching of the Shuttle should be considered. Ditching
should be beyond the continental shelf if safe nuclear payload recovery is not possible.
Ditching at sea would reduce the risk of general populace exposure to very low levels.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS : -j^g
 mosj. desirable situation would be to ditch in shallow waters in such a manner
that isotope or fission product containment would not be breached at impact. Safe recovery
would then be possible and eventual release to the sea would be avoided. If there is a high
risk or radioactive release in continental shelf waters, ditching should be in the deep ocean
areas beyond the continental shelf. A release in deep ocean areas should present no dis-
cernible hazard to the general public.
REFERENCES:
72SD4201-4-1
72SD4201-4-2
Sections 3, 4, 5, 6, 7
Section 4
CROSS REFERENCES:
SPACE SHUTTLE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GO-130
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Shuttle
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Reactor, IRV, Small Isotope
Sources
OPERATION
Earth Impact Recovery
MISSION PHASE/EVENT
Launch/Ascent, End of Mission
TITLE: TRACKING AND LOCATION AIDS
STATEMENT. provi(je tracking and location capability for early land and water recovery.
JUSTIFICATION ; In the event of an abort during Launch/Ascent or Descent/Reentry, the
nuclear payload may be jettisoned from the Shuttle and permitted to reenter in a random
fashion. It is desirable to recover the payload as quickly as possible to reduce the hazard
that it represents. Therefore, tracking and location aids should be provided.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS: Transponders, pingers, dye markers, etc., can be considered. Reliability over
the years of lifetime in a wide range of temperatures and severe radiation environment
must be an important design tool.
REFERENCES:
72SD4201-4-1
72SD4201-4-2
Sections 3,4, 5, 7
Section 4
CROSS REFERENCES:
SPACE SHUTTLE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GO-131
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Shuttle
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM Reactor, IRV,
Small Isotope Sources, Shuttle
OPERATION
Emergency Recovery
MISSION PHASE/EVENT
Launch/Ascent, On-Orbit Operations, End of Mission
TITLE: EMERGENCY PAYLOAD RETRIEVAL/RECOVERY
STATEMENT . Provide for emergency retrieval/recovery of nuclear equipment if jettisoned
from the Space Shuttle.
JUSTIFICATION-. ^ nuclear power system such as a reactor or an isotope heat source could
inadvertently be jettisoned from the Space Shuttle cargo bay. A retrieval/recovery system
should be devised for use in such instances because an unrecovered nuclear system would
reenter and impact randomly, with greater hazard to the earth's populace than if it were
returned by the Space Shuttle.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS: The Shuttle emergency retrieval/recovery system must be capable of grappling an
uncontrolled, tumbling piece of nuclear hardware. If the nuclear system has been damaged,
additional hazards may be involved (such as increased radiation field and/or released
radioactive material) which warrant additional precautions.
REFERENCES:
72SD4201-4-1 Sections 3, 4, 5
CROSS REFERENCES:
GD-127
SPACE SHUTTLE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GO-132
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Shuttle
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM Reactor, IRV,
Small Isotope Sources, Ground
Support
OPERATION
Earth Impact/Recovery
MISSION PHASE/4vENT
Launch/Ascent, End of Mission
TITLE: IMPACT/RECOVERY TEAM
STATEMENT: Provide trained impact/recovery team and procedures for:
• Recovery
• Fire protection
• Radiation control
• Decontamination
JUSTIFICATION: nuclear reactor or an isotope heat source that has impacted on the earth's
surface following a Shuttle abort must, if possible, be recovered to reduce the nuclear
safety hazard to the general populace. Recovery operations will entail radiation control
and probably decontamination of the impact area. Trained personnel are required for the st
operations.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS:
REFERENCES:
72SD4201-4-1
72SD4201-4-2
Sections 3, 4, 5, 7
Section 4
CROSS REFERENCES:
SPACE SHUTTLE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GO-133
PROGRAM EUEMENT
Shuttle
SYSTEM-SUB SYSTEM ReactO!", IRV,
Small Isotope Sources, Ground
Support
OPERATION
Shuttle Launch
MISSION PHASE /EVENT
Launch/Ascent
TITLE: WEATHER RESTRICTIONS
STATEMENT: Prohibit launch during unsatisfactory weather conditions, including moderate
to high winds blowing towards populated areas.
JUSTIFICATION :
 If an accident occurs on the launch pad or during lift-off, radioactive
material may be released. Adverse weather conditions can result in widespread dispersior
of the radioactive debris. To reduce the risk to the general public of such an event,
launches during unsatisfactory weather (including moderate to high winds blowing towards
populated areas) should be prohibited.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS:
contamination of facilities and KSC property and the potential risk to person-
nel resulting from a launch pad accident can be minimized by scheduling Shuttle launches
with nuclear payloads when winds are blowing out to sea.
REFERENCES:
72SD4201-4-1
72SD4201-4-2
Section 3, 4, 5, 7
Section 4
CROSS REFERENCES:
SPACE SHUTTLE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GO-134
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Shuttle
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Reactor, IRV, Small Isotope
Sources, Shuttle
OPERATION
Shuttle Transport
MISSION PHASE /EVENT
Launch/Ascent, On-Orbit Operations, End of Mission
TITLE: NUCLEAR RADIATION PROTECTION
STATEMENT : Minim fog the crew dose rate throughout all operations (maximum of 150
mr em/day).
JUSTIFICATION : The allowable exposure limit currently in use by NASA is a yearly average
of 200 mrem/day to the bone marrow (5cm depth) from all radiation sources. Cosmic,
galactic, and trapped radiation contribute approximately 50 mrem/day. Therefore, the
Shuttle crew dose rate should be minimized with a maximum allowable dose rate from the
nuclear pay load of 150 mrem/day.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS: The 150 mrem/day maximum allowable dose rate from the nuclear payload is
based on yearly averages. Since most crew time durations are short, higher dose rates
may be permissable for short periods of time.
REFERENCES:
72SD4201-4-1 Sections 3, 4, 5; Appendices A, B, C
L
CROSS REFERENCES:
GO-108, 135
GD-108, 117
SPACE SHUTTLE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GO-135
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Shuttle
SYSTEM—SUBSYSTEM
Reactor, IRV, Small Isotope
Sources, Shuttle
OPERATION
Contingencies
MISSION PHASE /EVENT
Launch/Ascent, On-Orbit Operations, End of Mission
TITLE: NUCLEAR RADIATION PROTECTION DURING CONTINGENCIES
STATEMENT: Minimize radiation dose to crews performing contingency operations (maxi-
mum of 150 mrem/day from nuclear sources should be maintained).
JUSTIFICATION : The allowable exposure limit currently in use by NASA is a yearly average
of 200 mrem/day to the bone marrow (5cm depth) from all radiation sources. Cosmic,
galactic, and trapped radiation contribute approximately 50 mrem/day. Therefore, the
Shuttle crew dose rate should be minimized during all contingency operations with a maxi-
mum allowable dose rate from the nuclear payload of 150 mrem/day.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS: The 150 mrem/day maximum allowable dose rate from the nuclear payload is
based on yearly averages. Since most crew time durations are short, higher dose rates
may be permissable for short periods of time.
REFERENCES:
72SD4201-4-1 Sections 3, 4, 5, 6; Appendices A, B, C
CROSS REFERENCES:
GO-134
SPACE SHUTTLE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GO-136
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Shuttle
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Reactor, IRV, Small Isotope
Sources, Shuttle
OPERATION
Contingencies
MISSION PHASE
Launch/Ascent, On-Orbit Operations, End of Mission
TITLE: BACK-UP SHUTTLE CAPABILITY
STATEMENT
 : Consider use of a back-up Shuttle to support repair of a failed Shuttle or
transfer or retrieval of the payload in orbit for the continuance of the mission.
JUSTIFICATION: ff an in-orbit accident renders the Shuttle orbiter incapable of completing
the intended mission, a back-up Shuttle should be considered to support repair of the failed
Shuttle or to transfer or retrieve the nuclear hardware for the successful continuance of the
mission. This contingency action increases the probability that the crew and the payload
can be rescued, and eliminates or substantially reduces the adverse effects on the mission
and the risks involved in allowing the failed Shuttle and/or nuclear hardware to reenter
from low earth orbit with relatively short orbital decay times.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS: The Shuttle handling equipment and cargo transfer mechanisms must be capable
of grappling a randomly tumbling piece of hardware that could weigh several metric tons.
REFERENCES:
72SD4201-4-1 Sections 4, 5, 6
L
CROSS REFERENCES:
SPACE SHUTTLE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO"
GO-137
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Shuttle
SYSTEM—SUBSYSTEM
Reactor, IRV, Small Isotope
Sources, Shuttle
OPERATION
Contingencies
MISSION PHASE/4vENT
Launch/Ascent, On-Orbit Operations, End of Mission
TITLE: Extended Orbital Stay Time
STATEMENT : Provide contingencies for Shuttle orbital stay times of up to 20 days to allow
for repairs to be made.
JUSTIFICATION : The primary contingency plan should include consideration for repair if it is
found impossible to remove the nuclear payload from the Shuttle orbiter cargo bay due to
failures in the transfer mechanisms or docking of the nuclear hardware cannot be completec
due to interface problems, ff repair is possible, a back-up Shuttle should be available
within approximately 12 days (time allowed for hardware preparation and launch prepara-
tion) to provide the necessary logistic and maintenance support. These operations would
necessarily require a Shuttle orbital stay time of up to 20 days.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS: The Shuttle, with its nuclear payload, could be docked to the Space Base and
powered down in the interim with the Shuttle crew billeted in the Space Base. Radiation
limits for the Shuttle crew should be carefully controlled to minimize the radiation doses
to the crew.
REFERENCES:
72SD4201-4-1 Section 6
CROSS REFERENCES:
SPACE SHUTTLE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GO-138
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Shuttle
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
I Reactor, IRV, Small IsotopeSources. Shuttle
OPERATION
Contingencies
MISSION PHASE/4vENT
Launch/Ascent, On-Orbit Operations, End of Mission
TITLE: IN-ORBIT REPAIRS
STATEMENT: Where in-orbit repairs of interfacing non-nuclear hardware (transfer mech-
anisms, etc.) are unsuccessful, the Shuttle and payload should return to earth.
JUSTIFICATION: When non-reparable equipment failures preclude in-orbit docking and ' -.
transfer operations, it is desirable to recover the nuclear payload and return it to earth
rather than jettisoning the nuclear payload in low earth orbit (for possible recovery at a
later date) or to boost the payload to a high earth disposal orbit. Therefore, when in-orbit
repairs are unsuccessful, the Shuttle and payload should return to the landing site. The
nuclear payload can be stored at the launch/landing site for use at a later date.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS: Positive control of the nuclear payloads should be maintained at all times to pre-
vent a possibly .hazardous and undesired event such as uncontrolled, random reentry.
REFERENCES:
72SD4201-4-1 Section 6
CROSS REFERENCES:
SPACE SHUTTLE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GO-139
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Shuttle
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Reactor, IRV, Small Isotope
Sources, Shuttle
OPERATION
Contingencies
MISSION PHASE /EVENT
Launch/Ascent, On-Orbit Operations, End of Mission
TITLE: EMERGENCY PAYLOAD EJECTION THROUGH CARGO BAY DOORS
STATEMENT. Consider payload ejection through cargo bay doors if doors cannot be opened.
JUSTIFICATION : The nuclear payload emergency ejection mode may involve the opening of the
Shuttle cargo bay doors. If the doors fail to open, consideration should be given to emer-
gency ejection through the doors. If the emergency ejection were done over the ocean, this
would reduce the nuclear hazard potential involved with a Shuttle/nuclear payload crash.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS: The cargo bay doors should be designed such that an impact of this type on the
doors would cause severence of door hinges or other attachments so that damage can re-
main isolated from the Shuttle proper. The design and aerodynamic implications of these
situations must be addressed.
REFERENCES;
72SD4201-4-1 Sections
CROSS REFERENCES:
SPACE SHUTTLE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GO-140
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Shuttle
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Reactor, IRV, Small Isotope
Sources, Shuttle
OPERATION
Launch and In-Orbit Transfer
MISSION PHASE /EVENT
Launch/Ascent, On-Orbit Operations
TITLE: LAUNCH AND IN-ORBIT TRANSFER OPERATIONS (REACTOR)
STATEMENT : Provide certifled operational plans to launch and perform orbital transfer
operations involving nuclear hardware.
JUSTIFICATION : The critical nature of nuclear hardware and the potential radiological
hazards that could occur during a mission involving a nuclear payload warrant specially
certified operational plans for launch and all in-orbit transfer operations.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS: The launch trajectory should minimize overflight of land and the continental shelf
to reduce the nuclear hazard potential if an accident occurs. The contamination of facilities
and KSC property and the potential risk to personnel resulting from a launch pad accident
can be minimized by scheduling Shuttle launches with nuclear payloads when winds are
blowing out to sea.
All in-orbit transfer operations should be performed such that (1) the maximum allowable
Shuttle crew dose rate of 150 mrem/day is not exceeded, and (2) positive handling control
of the nuclear system is maintained.
REFERENCES:
72SD4201-4-1 Sections 3, 4, 5; Appendices B and C
CROSS REFERENCES:
GO-141, 142, 143
SPACE SHUTTLE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GO-141
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Shuttle
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM OPERATION
Reactor, IRV, Small
Isotope Sources. Shuttle
In-Orbit Cargo Transfer
MISSION PHASE /EVENT
On-Orbit Operations
TITLE: NUCLEAR CARGO TRANSFER
STATEMENT : Provide positive control of nuclear payloads during all handling
operations.
JUSTIFICATION:
 The nuciear radiation, high temperatures, and sometimes large mass
associated with nuclear power systems present various hazards when handling operations
are involved. The isotope inventory of a large heat source or the fission product inven-
tory of a spent reactor, represents a potential hazard to the earth's populace if the system
is allowed to rcenter the earth's atmosphere and impact the earth's surface in a random
fashion. For these reasons, positive control of the nuclear payloads is required during
all in-orbit handling operations.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS:
REFERENCES:
72SD4201-4-1 Sections 3,4, 5
CROSS REFERENCES:
GO-140
SPACE SHUTTLE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GO-142
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Shuttle
SYSTEM—SUBSYSTEM
Reactor, mv, Small
Isotope Sources, Shuttle
OPERATION
la-Orbit Cargo Transfer
MISSION PHASE /EVENT
On-Orbit Operations
TITLE: NUCLEAR CARGO TRANSFER OPERATIONS
STATEMENT : Provide nuclear cargo transfer operations that do not involve EVA.
JUSTIFICATION : Nuclear cargo such as isotope heat sources and reactors present a
safety hazard to crew members who might be involved in EVA associated with transfer of
such cargo. Hazards result from the radiation emanating from the nuclear device, from
the high surface temperatures that may exist, and from the mass of equipment such as
reactors and large isotope sources. Therefore, EVA should be avoided, and transfer
operations using remote handling equipment and special transfer devices should be planned.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS:
REFERENCES:
72SD4201-4-1 Sections 3,4, 5
CROSS REFERENCES:
GO-140
SPACE SHUTTLE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GO-143
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Shuttle
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Reactor, IRV, Small
Isotope Sources, Shuttle
OPERATION
In-Orbit Cargo Transfer
MISSION PHASE/EVENT
On-Orbit Operations
TITLE: NUCLEAR CARGO TRANSFER VISIBILITY
STATEMENT : Provide direct visual or TV coverage of all nuclear cargo transfer
operations.
JUSTIFICATION : Since Jhe transfer of nuclear cargo is to be by the use of remote handling
gear, and since certain hazards are involved in the transfer operations, direct visual or
TV coverage must be provided to reduce the risks as much as possible.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS:
REFERENCES:
72SD4201-4-1 Sections 3, 4, 5
CROSS REFERENCES:
GO-140
SPACE SHUTTLE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GO-144
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Shuttle
SYSTEM—SUBSYSTEM
Reactor, IRV, Small
Isotope Sources, Shuttle
OPERATION
In-Orbit Cargo Handling
and Transfer
MISSION PHASE/EVENT
On-Orbit Operations
TITLE: ALTERNATE PAYLOAD HANDLING OPERATIONS
STATEMENT : Provide alternate and/or redundant equipment and procedures for nuclear
cargo handling.
JUSTIFICATION : The nuclear radiation and heat generation associated with nuclear
payloads make it essential that planned handling operations be carried out promptly and
with precision. TO accomplish this, alternate and/or redundant handling mechanisms must
be provided to permit the continuation of transfer operations.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS:
REFERENCES:
72SD4201-4-1 Sections 3,4, 5
L
CROSS REFERENCES:
SPACE SHUTTLE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GO-145
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Shuttle
SYSTEM—SUBSYSTEM
Reactor, IRV, Small
Isotope Sources, Shuttle
OPERATION
Contingencies
MISSION PHASE /EVENT
On-Orbit Operations, End of Mission
TITLE: EMERGENCY IN-ORBIT RETRIEVAL
STATEMENT : Consider feasibility of uncooperative "tumbling" power module retrieval
with Shuttle.
JUSTIFICATION : jf
 an jn.orkit accident results in the release of the nuclear payload,
emergency retrieval operations must be initiated to prevent the nuclear hazard potential
associated with an uncontrolled, random reentry of nuclear hardware from low earth orbit.
In all likelihood, the released nuclear payload will not be stable, but will be tumbling in a
random fashion. Therefore, me feasibility of employing retrieval/grappling techniques to
retrieve uncooperative "tumbling" payloads should be considered.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS: Tracking devices (transponders, beacons, etc.) on the nuclear payload should
aid in location and rendezvous.
REFERENCES:
72SD4201-4^1 Sections 3,6
CROSS REFERENCES:
SPACE SHUTTLE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GO-146
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Shuttle
SYSTEM—SUBSYSTEM
Reactor, IRV, Small Isotope
Sources, Ground Support
OPERATION
Shuttle Landing
MISSION PHASE/EVENT End of Mission
TITLE: SHUTTLE LANDING AREA
STATEMENT.- Provide Shuttle landing area remote from inhabited facilities.
JUSTIFICATION : Beacuse of the potential exposure to radioactive materials that could
occur as the result of a mishap prior to or at touchdown of the Shuttle orbiter carrying
a spent reactor or an isotope power sytem, the area should be cleared of human habitation.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS: The touchdown location on the runway should be approximately 4 km from KSC
inhabited facilities to minimize the risk from a potential release of radioactive material.
L
REFERENCES:
72SD4201-4-1 Section 3,4,5 and 7
72SD4201-4-2 Section 4
CROSS REFERENCES:
SPACE SHUTTLE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GO-147
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Shuttle
SYSTEM-SUBSYSTEM
Shuttle
OPERATION
Contingencies
MISSION PHASE/EVENT
Launch/Ascent
TITLE: DUMPING OF EXCESS SHUTTLE PROPELLANT
STATEMENT : Consider dumping of excess Shuttle propellant prior to landing to minimize
explosive potential.
JUSTIFICATION : if
 an equipment failure is detected early in the Launch/Ascent Phase which
aborts the mission, it may be necessary to consider dumping of Shuttle fuel to meet landing
weight limits and to avoid landing with a large and potentially explosive fuel load. There-
fore, if an explosion were to occur on landing, the blast and fragmentation environment
would be significantly less severe, thereby reducing the potential for a release of radio-
active material.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS:
REFERENCES:
72SD42 01-4-1 Section 6
CROSS REFERENCES:
SPACE SHUTTLE NUCLEAR SYSTEM SAFETY
GUIDELINE
DATE
JAN 72
NO.
GO-148
PROGRAM ELEMENT
Shuttle
SYSTEM—SUBSYSTEM
Ground Support, Shuttle
OPERATION
Contingencies
MISSION PHASE/EVENT
TITLE: SHUTTLE DEFUELING
STATEMENT : Provide capability to defuel the Shuttle in nuclear emergencies on the
launch pad.
JUSTIFICATION : -j^g jjiasf; overpressures resulting from a launch pad explosion of the
Shuttle fuel tankage are so high that it precludes the use of any material that would with-
stand the blast loading. In all likelihood, in the event of a Shuttle explosion on the launch
pad, the nuclear payload will be thrown or blasted out of the cargo bay by the resultant
overpressures. Because of this severe blast and fragmentation environment, radioactive
debris may be released in the immediate vicinity of the launch pad. Therefore, if there
are indications that an explosion of the Shuttle fuel tankage is imminent, provisions should
be made for emergency defueling.
HAZARD
CATEGORY
REMARKS: other reasons for providing emergency defueling capabilities are:
• A NaK leak in a reactor coolant loop is detected after the power module has been
installed in the Shuttle orbiter cargo bay (an explosion could result because of the
violent reaction when NaK comes in contact with oxygen).
• On-pad cooling for an isotope payload malfunction resulting in increased heat
source temperatures (ignition of propellant fumes could occur).
REFERENCES:
72SD4201-4-1 Sections 3,6; Appendix A
CROSS REFERENCES:
CONVERSION FACTORS
INTERNATIONAL TO ENGLISH UNITS
Physical Quantity
Acceleration
Area
Density
Energy
Force
Length
Mass
Power
Pressure
Speed
Temperature
Volume
International
Units English Units
m/sec ft/sec
m2 ft2
in2
Kg/m2 lb/ft3
lb/in3
Joule Btu
Newton Ibf
m ft
nm
Kg Ibm
watt Btu/sec
Btu/min
Btu/hr
Newton/m2 Atmosphere
lbf/in2
lbf/ft2
m/sec ft/sec (fps)
K F
m3 in3
ft3
Conversion Factor
Multiply By
3.281
10.764
1550.39
6.242 x 10~2
3.610 x 10~5
9.479 x 10"4
2.248x 10"1-
3.281
5.399X 10~4
2.205
9. 488x10."*
5.691 x 10~2
3.413
3.413
1.451 x 10"4
2.088xlO-2
3.281
(9/5 -459.67/tK)
6.097xl04
35.335
GLOSSARY OF TERMS
Abort
Accident
Airborne Material
Breached
Bulk Damage (Radiation)
Contamination
Control Drum Motion
Core Compaction
Cover Gas
Credible
Criticality
Critical Mass
Cumulative Probability
Damaged
Decontamination
Destructive Excursion
Disassembly/Disassembled
Disposal
Distributed Material
Dose Guidelines
Dosimetry
Premature and abrupt termination of an event or mission because of existing or Imminent
degradation or failure of hardware. (In the safety analysis, no distinction is made between
an accident and abort.)
An undesirable unplanned event which may or may not result from a system failure or mal-
function.
Radioactive gases, vapors and partlculates released to the air.
Fuel elements, coolant loops, pressure vessel, core, or radiation shield are (a) physically
torn by thermal or mechanical stresses, (b) cut open by fragmentation or (c) split open by
internal pressures.
Radiation causing atomic displacement In semiconductor devices - sometimes commonly
referred to as "crystal" damage.
A condition where a radioactive material Is mixed or adheres to a desirable substance or
where radioactivity has spread to places where it may harm persons, experiments or make
areas unsafe.
Rotation of the control drums or drum toward or away from the most reactive position within
a reactor. (As used In safety analysis results in a reactor excursion.)
The act of Increasing the density of the core which results In Increased reactivity, and possible
crltlcallty.
A gas blanket used to provide an Inert atmospheric environment around hardware to minimize
potential reactions which can give rise to accident situations.
An event haying a relative or cumulative probability of occurence of •> 10" .
The act of obtaining and sustaining a chain reaction.
The mass of fissionable material necessary to obtain crlticality.
Sometimes referred to as "Mission probability" is the overall probability of a sequence of
events occurring (product of "relative probabilities" of the Individual events along a path of
an abort sequence tree).
Same as "Breached".
The removal of undesired dispersed radioactive substances from material, personnel, rooms,
equipment, air, etc. (e.g., washing, filtering, chipping).
An excursion (safety analysis assumes ~ 100 MW-sec) accompanied by a complete disassembly
of the reactor, a prompt radiation emission and release of fission product gases, vapors and
partlculates.
Nuclear hardware (e.g., reactor) which has been violently broken or separated into parts and
not capable of forming a critical mass.
The planned discarding or recovery of nuclear hardware.
The spread of nuclear fuel and radioactive debris on the earth's surface following impact or
destructive excursion.
Established radiation levels used in the nuclear safety analysis for evaluating number of
exposures and in determining operating limits and boundaries.
Techniques used in the measurement of radiation.
n
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (CONT)
Dynamic Interference
Early Reactor Disposal
Electrical Power System
End of Mission
Excursion *
Exposure Limit
Fission Products
Fuel
Fuel Element/Capsule
Fuel Element Ablation
Fuel Element Burial
Gallery
Ground Deposited Particles
Hazard
Hazard Source
Immediate Reentry
Impact in Deep Ocean
Impact in Reservoir
Impact in Water Containing
Edible Marine Life
Intact Reentry/Reactor
Integrated/Cumulative Dose
Interfacing Vehicle
An experiment radiation effect where the flux rate above some threshold (a fraction of the ex-
periment signal-to-noise ratio at maximum sensitivity, for electronic detectors) causes
noticeable degradation of data quality.
Attempted disposal of the reactor prior to its successful completion of 5 years operational
lifetime.
All components (heat source, regulation, control, power conversion and radiators) necessary
for the development of electrical power. The reactor electrical power system includes all
hardware associated with the Power Module with the exception of the Disposal System.
Generally associated with the termination of the mission or flight. Is also used to define those
activities involved with disposal and recovery of hardware after Intended lifetime.
A rapid and usually unplanned increase in thermal power associated with the operation of a
power reactor.
Total accumulated or time dependent radiation exposure limits imposed on personnel by regula-
tory agencies or limits which preclude equipment damage.
The nuclides (quite often radioactive) produced by the fission of a heavy element nucllde such
as U-235 or Pu-239.
Fissionable material in a reactor or radioisotopes in a heat source used in producing energy.
A shaped body of nuclear fuel prepared for use in a reactor or heat source. Common usage
involves some form of encapsulation.
Fuel element clad and/or fuel removed by reentry heating, releasing fission products to the
atmosphere.
Individual fuel elements beneath the ground surface completely covered by soil.
The compartment of the reactor shield which houses the major primary loop components.
Particles deposited on the ground from radioactive fallout.
An existing situation caused by an unsafe act or condition which can result in harm or
damage to personnel and equipment.
The location and/or origin of the hazard.
Very early reentry of the reactor (e.g., misaligned thrust vector which causes firing of the
reactor disposal rockets toward earth resulting In 1-2 day reentry).
Reentering and/or impact of nuclear material in the ocean, beyond the Continental Shelf where
contamination of the food chain is extremely remote.
Reentering and/or impact of nuclear material in reservoir containing potable drinking water.
Reentering and/or impact of nuclear material on the Continental Shelf or in a body of
water such as a lake, river or stream where contamination of the food chain is likely.
A nuclear system that retains its integrity upon impact and in the case of a reactor is capable
of undergoing an excursion.
The total dose resulting from all or repeated exposures to radiation.
Any defined module, spacecraft, booster or logistic vehicle which may have an interaction
with the Manned Space Base.
Ill
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (CONT)
lonlzation Damage
Land Impact
Loss of Coolant
Mission Support
Moderator
NaK-78
No Discernible Hazard
Non-credible
Non-destructive Excursion
Normal Operations
Over Moderation
Permanent Shutdown
Poison
Power Module
Premature Reentry
Pre-poison
Prompt Radiation
Quasi-Steady State
Radiological Consequences
Radiological Hazards
Radiological Risk
Random Reentry
Reactivity
Radiation causing surface damage in materials (e.g., the fogging of film).
Nuclear hardware which impacts land at terminal velocities following reentry and lower velo-
cities during prelaunch or early in the launch/ascent phase.
Loss of organic or liquid metal coolant in reactor coolant loops due to failure/accident.
Supporting functions provided the Space Base Program by ground personnel and Interfacing
vehicles throughout all mission phases.
Material used in a nuclear reactor to slow down neutrons from the high energies at which they
are released to increase the probability of neutron capture: Water and hydrogen are modera-
tors in a thermal reactor.
An alloy of sodium (22% by weight) and potassium (78%) used as a liquid metal heat transfer
fluid.
Represents no hazard to the general populace.
An event having a relative or cumulative probability of occurrence of < 10
not worthy of concern.
-12 Considered
A temperature excursion which may rupture the primary coolant loop and release fission pro-
ducts to the environment but - leaves the reactor shield essentially intact.
Planned and anticipated mission activities and events.
Immersion of reactor in an hydrogenous medium (moderator) resulting in increased neutron
reflection into the core causing a reactor excursion.
Enacting provisions which preclude reactor criticality under all foreseeable circumstances.
A material that absorbs neutrons and reduces the reactivity of a reactor.
The complete reactor/shield, radiator, power conversion system and disposal system unit as
provided on the Space Base.
Any reentry of the reactor from Earth orbit with orbital lifetimes less than the planned (1167
year) orbital decay time of the 990 km disposal altitude.
A poison which is added to the reactor fuel for purposes of controlling reacticlty. Sometimes
referred to as "burnable poison".
The neutron and gamma radiation released coincident with the fission process as opposed to the
radiation from fission product decay. Commonly associated with an excursion event.
A term used to describe the condition when a reactor periodically goes critical and then sub-
critical due to water surging in and out of the core.
The radiation exposure effect on personnel and the ecology from a radiation release accident or
event.
Hazards associated with radiation as differentiated from other sources.
The term used to define the average number of people anticipated to be affected by radiation
in a given mission or phase thereof.
The uncontrolled non-directed reentry of a vehicle from orbit.
A measure of the departure of a reactor from critical such that positive values correspond to
reactors super-critical and negative values to reactors which are sub-critical. (Usually ex-
pressed in multiples of a dollar.)
IV
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (CONT)
Reactor Fails to Survive Reentry
Reactor Survives Reentry
Reactor/Shield
Relative Probability
Repair/Replacement
Ruptured
Safety
Safety Catastrophic
Safety Critical
Safety Marginal
Safety Negligible
Scram System
System Safety
Space Base Program
Space Debris
Space Shuttle
Source Terms
Tracer
Reactor/shield is completely disassembled by reentry heating, releasing Individual fuel ele-
ments and structural debris to the atmosphere.
Reactor is not disassembled by reentry heating; radiation shield may be damaged.
A system containing the reactor, control drums, gallery and surrounding LiH and Tungsten
shield.
Probability of the occurrence of a particular event given a defined set of choices.
Consists of (a) physically repairing all faulty systems, or (b) complete replacement of the
faulty system(s).
Same as "Breached".
Freedom from chance of injury or loss to personnel, equipment or property.
Condltlon(s) such that environment, personnel error, design characteristics, procedural
deficiencies, or subsystem or component malfunction will severely degrade system perform-
ance, and cause subsequent system loss, death, or multiple Injuries to personnel (SPD-1A).
Condltion(s) such that environment, personnel error, design characteristics, procedural
deficiencies, or subsystem or component malfunction will cause equipment damage or per-
sonnel Injury, or will result in a hazard requiring immediate corrective action for personnel
or system survival (SPD-1A). '
Condition(s) such that environment, personnel error, design characteristics, procedural
deficiencies, or subsystem failure or component malfunction will degrade system perform-
ance but which can be counteracted or controlled without major damage or any injury to
personnel (SPD-1A).
Condition(s) such that personnel error, design characteristics, procedural deficiencies, or
subsystem failure or component malfunction will not result in minor system degradation and
will not produce system functional damage or personnel injury (SPD-1A).
A separate, possibly automatic, mechanism used to rapidly shut down a reactor.
The optimum degree of risk management within the constraints of operational effectiveness,
time and cost attained through the application of management and engineering principles
throughout all phases of a program.
All aspects of the Space Base mission including all prime and support hardware and personnel
both on the ground, at sea or In orbit, which are required throughout all mission phases.
Uncontrolled radioactive or non-radioactive man-made objects in space; these objects may
present collision and radiation hazards to earth orbital missions.
The manned vehicle used for the transportation of cargo to and from earth orbit. A sepa-
rately launched vehicle (booster) on which the Shuttle is placed provides the initial first
stage thrust.
Characterization of a radiation hazard with regard to (a) location, (b) magnitude, and
(c) exposure mode.
Material in which isotopes of an element may be Incorporated to make possible observation
of the course of the element through a chemical, biological or physical process.
V/VI
G E N E R A L ® E L E C T R I C
/"l/i/ic/on / Headquarters: Valley Forge, Pennsylvania D Daytona Beach, Fla. Q Cape Kennedy, Fla.
UIVISIUII I (-j Evendale, Ohio D Huntsville, Ala. Q Bay St. Louis, Miss. D Houston, Texas Q Newport Beach, Calif.
